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FISA SECTION 702
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OF

John F. Schifalacqua*
ABSTRACT

This article seeks to turn a critical eye toward to the Reauthorization Act -both its
development and future challenges-as a way to evaluate the current state of Section
702 since its recent reauthorization. To establish a historical context, Part II will lay
out the general history of Section 702, its requirements, and the techniques the
government has typically deployed under its authority. Part III will develop an
account of the legislative history of the Reauthorization Act to highlight the keys issues
of contention in public discourse over Section 702. Part IV will detail the key changes
to Section 702 implemented by Congress. Part V will then describe the typical
constitutional challenges to Section 702 prior to the Reauthorization Act and reassess
the viability of in light of the key changes to the program. Finally, Part VI will
conclude by offering positive developments and missed opportunities from the debates.
Overall, this article seeks to emphasize that the responsibility to protect constitutional
rights while simultaneously ensuring national security can at times feel like a
herculean duty. But this balance is often best struck on the front end when members
of Congress and are pressured to reform national security authorities rather than rely
on Executive agencies to utilize its surveillance tools according to an often malleable,
broad legal standard. Nevertheless, this Comment argues that there are presently
substantial avenues for litigants to challenge the newest changes to Section 702 under
the Fourth Amendment.
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"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. . . . The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."
Justice Louis Brandeis

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)

"We can't tie the hands of our national security officials at the
precise moment that our enemies are taking the gloves off around
the world. Terrorists don't plan to sunset their threats to our way
of life, so why should our important counterterrorism tools
sunset?"
Senator Tom Cotton, Speech before Congress, June 6, 2017
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INTRODUCTION

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was racing against an almost literal
ticking time bomb when agents coordinated with New York City law
enforcement to stop Najibullah Zazi as he crossed the George Washington
Bridge just days before the 2009 anniversary of 9/11.1 A search of Zazi' s rental
car was unfruitful and he grew suspicious that he was under surveillance and
aborted his so-called "martyrdom operation." 2 The operation began with a
2008 visit to an al-Qaeda stronghold in Pakistan where he received weapons
and bomb making training in hopes of fighting alongside the Taliban. Instead,
the Taliban directed him to return to the United States-where he was a legal
resident since emigrating from Afghanistan during high school-to devise a
suicide attack in New York City. 3 He spent most of 2009 procuring explosive
chemicals and preparing two other conspirators to carry out a coordinated
bombing around 9/ll's anniversary-targeting the New York City Subway,
Times Square, and Grand Central Station. 4 The plan was only days away from
fruition when he drove across the George Washington Bridge with hidden
bomb making materials in tow. His brief encounter with law enforcement on
the bridge scared him off and he fled to Colorado where he was arrested as he
tried to destroy evidence to thwart any subsequent investigation. 5

A.G. Sulzberger & William K. Rashbaum, Guilty Plea Made in Plot to Bomb New York
Subway, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/nyregion/
1

23terror.html (describing the case against Najibullah Zazi and his thwarted terrorist
plot to bomb the New York Subway on the anniversary of September 11th). See also
Inside the Zazi Arrest, NEWSWEEK (Sep. 25, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/
inside-zazi-arrest-79531 (describing the investigative details leading up to the Zazi
arrest, with particular emphasis on the successful coordination between law
enforcement entities).
2 Sulzberger & Rashbaum, supra note 1.
3

Id.

Carrie Johnson & Spencer S. Hsu, Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty in New York Subway
Plot, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/02/22/AR2010022201916.html; Susan Candiotti, Source: Terror plot targeted
Times Square, Grand Central stations, CNN (Apr. 12, 2010, 2:25 PM),
4

http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRlME/04/12/new.york.plot/.
5

See id.
95
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Zazi' s suspicion was certainly justified; law enforcement had been
keeping a close eye on him in the months before his arrest. 6 But Zazi could
not have known the full extent of the surveillance. The intelligence
community (IC) had long been on his tail, deploying some of its most
sophisticated surveillance methods to identify him and coordinate with the
FBI. The National Security Agency (NSA) used authority granted by Section
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to monitor an email
account used by an al-Qaeda operative in Pakistan.7 That operative had
received an email from a then-unknown person in the United States "urgently
seeking advice regarding how to make explosives." 8 The NSA passed along
this information to the FBI who used a National Security Letter 9 to rapidly
identify the unknown sender as Zazi. 10 From that point forward, the FBI began
a sensitive counterterrorism investigation to thwart what was considered "one
of the most serious threats to the United States since 9/11." 11
In retrospect, it was clear to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board (PCLOB) 12 -an entity that reviews the IC-that "without the initial tip-

See Inside the Zazi Arrest, supra note 1.
Guide to Section 702 Value Examples, Office of the Director of National Intelligence:
IC on the Record, Fact Sheet (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/Guide-toSection-702-Value-Examples.pdf.
6
7

8
9

Id.
Id. (explaining that National Security Letters are a type of administrative subpoena

certain law enforcement agencies can issue to businesses without a court order).
National security letters generally require the production of a narrow type of contentneutral records (e.g., information equivalent to a trap and trace list, not the content of
the conversations) to aid in a national security investigation. Statutory provisions for
these subpoenas range from §114(a)(5) of the Right to Financial Privacy to the
extensively used Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. §2709). See
CHARLES DOYLE, Summary, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL33320, NATIONAL SECURITY
LETTERS IN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT
AMENDMENTS (2008), https://fas.org!sgp/ crs/intel/RL33320. pdf#page=2.
10 Guide to Section 702, supra note 7.
11 Sulzberger & Rashbaum, supra note 1.
12 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1061, 118
Stat. 3638, 3684 (2004) (authorizing the PCLOB to continually review "regulations,
executive branch polices, and procedures ... related to laws pertaining to efforts to
protect the Nation from terrorism, and other actions by the executive branch related to
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off about Zazi and his plans, which came about by monitoring an overseas
foreigner under Section 702, the subway bombing might have succeeded." 13
In other words, foreign intelligence surveillance was critical in preventing the
attack. Indeed, the IC has long held that the authority for surveillance granted
by Section 702 is vital to national security. 14 There are many more examples
of successful counterterrorism beyond the Zazi plot to support this claim. 15
Members of the IC have testified as recently as 2017 that Section 702 is such a
critical tool that some "foreign intelligence cannot be practically obtained
through other methods" and the authority is a major contributor to
counterterrorism and counterintelligence. 16 In fact, former FBI Director James
Corney went as far as to say that Section 702 authorities are the "crown jewels"
of counterterrorism, without which "we will be less safe as a country." 17
Despite Section 702' s track record of success and significance as a national
security tool, it remains a contentious subject. The PCLOB recommended
several reforms despite a glowing review of the program's effectiveness, citing

efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are
protected.").
13 Guide to Section 702, supra note 7.
14 Id. (opining that "Title VII of FISA is vital to keeping the nation safe.
These
authorities provide the government with a uniquely effective way to acquire
information about the plans and identities of terrorists and terrorist organizations,
including how they function and receive support. These authorities also enable
collection of information about the intentions and capabilities of weapons proliferators
and other foreign adversaries who threaten the U.S. and inform cybersecurity efforts.").
15 Id. (stating that Section 702 success stories include the CIA using it "to alert[] a
foreign partner to the presence within its borders of an al-Qaeda sympathizer;" the
NSA collecting two years of intelligence on ISIS Finance Minister Hajji Iman; the FBI
exposing Shawn Parson as a "key player" and recruiter in the ISIS network; and the
U.S. helping to uncover the perpetrator of the deadly December 31, 2017 Turkish
nightclub attack).
16 Joint Statement for the Record Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 115th
Cong. 8 (Jun. 7, 2017) (statements of Daniel Coats, DNI; Michael Rogers, NSA; Rod
Rosenstein, DOJ; Andrew McCabe; FBI), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/os-dcoats-060717.pdf.
17 Read the full testimony of FBI Director James Camey in which he discusses Clinton email
investigation, WASH. POST (May 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpoli tics/wp/2017/05/03/read-the-full-testimony-of-fbi-director-james-comey-in-whichhe-discusses-clinton-email-investigation/?utm_term=. 944b623d6330.
97
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certain aspects of the Section 702 program push the program close to the line

of constitutional reasonableness. 1118 Much of the concern involves incidental
collection of data regarding U.S. persons that are not the target of a search at
the time it is made. 19 The broadness of Section 702' s grant of authority to
surveil any foreigner abroad who might possess foreign intelligence
information potentially means a large swath of people can be searched,
including their communications with U.S. citizens. 20 The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) warns that in the process of executing a Section 702
search, the IC collects a "vast trove of data for information specifically about
Americans, even though these communications were all collected without a
warrant." 21 The concern is that the government can search incidental data at
a later time "to prosecute Americans for crimes" unrelated to national security,
thereby doing a "backdoor" end-run around the Fourth Amendment. 22 And
there is certainly reason to believe abuse might be widespread, at least
concerning the invasion of privacy. A 2015 preliminary review found that
NSA analysts "running searches on emails and other digital communications

18 David S. Kris, Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: The FAA and
Beyond, HOOVER INST., Feb. 8, 2016, at 9, https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/

files/research/ docs/kris_trendspredictions _final_v4_digital. pdf#page=9.
19 Id. (providing, in relevant part, "[s]uch aspects [of constitutional concern] include
the unknown and potentially large scope of the incidental collection of US persons'
communications, the use of 'about' collection to acquire Internet communications that
are neither to nor from the target of surveillance, and the use of queries to search for
the communications of specific US persons within the information that has been
collected.").
20 See infra Part II.B. for details on how Section 702 operates in practice.
21 Warrantless Surveillance Under Section 702 of FISA, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/
issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/warrantless-surveillance-undersection-702-fisa (last visited Feb. 26, 2019). See also Barton Gellman, In NSA-Intercepted
Data, Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber the Foreigners Who Are, WASH. POST (July 5,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/worid/national-security/in-nsa-intercepteddata-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-whoare/2014/07/05/8139adf8045a-lle4-8572-4blb969b6322_story.html ("Nine of 10 account
holders found in a large cache of intercepted conversations, which former NSA
contractor Edward Snowden provided in full to The Post, were not the intended
surveillance targets but were caught in a net the agency had cast for somebody else.").
22 ACLU, supra note 21.
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vacuumed up from undersea internet cables frequently violated Americans'
privacy, albeit unintentionally." 23
It is hard to overstate the sheer amount of information the IC can acquire
under Section 702 authority.

By collecting data as it runs through

infrastructural switches that bring the Internet to the world -so-called
"upstream backbone facility" collection-the IC can "continuously scan
international internet traffic in bulk, looking for communications associated
with tens of thousands of 'targets."' 24 Such collection only requires a surfacelevel system of judicial oversight. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) need only approve a reasonable set of targeting procedures and
minimization standards designed to reduce the potential of surveilling
Americans. 25 As such, civil libertarians fear a process ripe for abuse. 26 Critics
paint an Orwellian picture that "broad, warrantless collection of data under
Section 702 creates an understandable fear that private messages may be read
or used by the government." 27 This issue is particularly acute when activists
and critics of the program feel targeted as they pursue advocacy to challenge
government practices under Section 702. 28 Intelligence collection is one thing,
23

Jenna McLaughlin, Report: NSA Analysts Frequently Broke Rules on Intelligence
Collection, FOREIGN POLICY, (May 12, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/12/
report-nsa-analysts-frequently-broke-rules-on-intelligence-collection/.
24 ACLU, supra note 21. See also Kris, supra note 18, at 9-10.
25 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(d)-(e) (providing, in relevant part, "[t]he Attorney General, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall adopt minimization
procedures that meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 1801(h)
of this title ... [and] ensure that any acquisition authorized under subsection (a) is
limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
and prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which the sender
and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the
United States.").
26 See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 21. See also, e.g., Andrea Peterson, LOVEINT: When NSA
Officers Use Their Spying Power on Love Interests, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/08/24/loveint-when-nsaofficers-use-their-spying-power-on-love-interests/?utm_term=.94b715045371.
27 ACLU, supra note 21.
28 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 406 (2013) (stating in relevant
part, "Respondents are attorneys and human rights, labor legal, and media
organizations Respondents are attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media
organizations whose work allegedly requires them to engage in sensitive and sometimes
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but law enforcement later searching data without restriction -data initially
collected for intelligence purposes-is quite another. It is not unfounded to
ask whether Section 702 permits the government to undermine the
Constitution on the pretense of national security.
At the core of the issue is the reoccurring "tension between privacy and
national security." 29 No amount of Zazis captured fully mitigate the history
of governmental abuse of counterterrorism tools. One court reminds us that
"in the 1960s and 1970s, the public was outraged over the revelation that the
government conducted domestic surveillance-in the name of national
security-of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Vietnam War protesters, and other
domestic groups the government labeled 'subversive."' 30 And whether such
a history repeats itself, as the court warns, is a specter haunting the debates
over Section 702. 31
Nowhere has this tension been more apparent recently than in the debates
preceding the passage of the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017
(Reauthorization Act). 32

The original statutory authority for Section 702

derives from the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), which was set to expire by the
end of 2017. With both its usefulness and dangers in mind, Congress debated
the efficacy of Section 702. The result was a renewal of the FAA and Section
702 authority until 2023-with some key changes-that was signed into law
by President Trump on January 19, 2018. 33

The debates preceding the

reauthorization of Section 702 and the changes to the program provide an
opportunity to take a fresh look at its value and constitutionality.

privileged telephone and e-mail communications with colleagues, clients, sources, and
other individuals located abroad .... Respondents claim that§ 1881a compromises their
ability to locate witnesses, cultivate sources, obtain information, and communicate
confidential information to their clients.").
29 United States v. Hasbajrami, No. 11-CR-623, 2016 WL 1029500, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
8, 2016).
30 Id. (citing DAVIDS. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, 1 NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
AND PROSECUTIONS§ 3.1 (2d ed. 2012)).
31
32

Id.

FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-118, 132 Stat. 4 (2018).
Statement by the President on FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, THE
WHITEHOUSE: STATEMENTS AND RELEASES (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/statement-president-fisa-amendments-reauthorization-act-2017/.
33
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This article seeks to turn a critical eye toward to the Reauthorization Actboth its development and future challenges-as a way to evaluate the current
state of Section 702 since its recent reauthorization. To establish a historical
context, Part II will lay out the general history of Section 702, its requirements,
and the techniques the government has typically deployed under its authority.
Part III will develop an account of the legislative history of the Reauthorization
Act to highlight the keys issues of contention in public discourse concerning
Section 702. Part IV will detail the key changes to Section 702 implemented by
Congress. Part V will then describe the typical constitutional challenges to
Section 702 prior to the Reauthorization Act and reassess the viability of those
challenges in light of the key changes to the program. Finally, Part VI will
conclude by offering positive developments and missed opportunities from
the debates. Overall, this article seeks to emphasize that the responsibility to
protect constitutional rights while simultaneously ensuring national security
can at times feel like a herculean duty. However, this balance is often best
struck on the front end when members of Congress are pressured to reform
national security authorities rather than rely on Executive agencies to utilize
their surveillance tools according to a broad and often malleable legal
standard. Nevertheless, this article argues that there are presently substantial
avenues for litigants to challenge the newest changes to Section 702 under the
Fourth Amendment.

I.

ORIGIN AND AUTHORITIES
OF SECTION

A.

702

Background of FISA and Section 702

It is useful to begin by differentiating between the two statutes under which

the government can conduct electronic surveillance:

Title III and FISA.

Generally, Title III concerns electronic surveillance the government may
deploy for criminal law enforcement purposes. FISA exists within the realm
of foreign intelligence operations and was enacted much later. But the clear
line between the two is more an ideal than a reality. 34 Some of the core
34 USA Patriot Act Amendments to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Authorities:
Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intel., 109th Cong. (2005) (statements of U.S.

IOI
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constitutional issues with Section 702 arise from the blurring of this boundary
between foreign intelligence gathering and criminal investigation. 35
Unsurprisingly then, the onus for passing FISA-and ultimately expanding it
under Section 702-develops out of the interplay between the boundaries set
by Fourth Amendment electronic surveillance case law and flexibility needed
to protect the nation.
The first case setting a substantive boundary was Katz v. United States. In
that seminal case, the government introduced evidence obtained by
"attach[ing] an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the
public telephone booth from which [the defendant] had placed his calls." 36 In
a critical passage, Justice Stewart declared that "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places" and that a physical intrusion into a protected area
was not necessary to constitute a Fourth Amendment violation-privacy
would be the new compass rose directing the analysis. 37 By overruling longstanding property-based precedent established in Olmstead v. United States, 38
the government could no longer conduct electronic surveillance without
conforming to the privacy limits implied by the Fourth Amendment. 39 A court

Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales & Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI),
https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg24983/html/CHRG109shrg24983.htm ("the USA PATRIOT Act helped to bring down this 'wall' separating
intelligence and law enforcement officials. They erased the perceived statutory
impediment to more robust information sharing between intelligence and law
enforcement personnel. They also provided the necessary impetus for the removal of
the formal administrative restrictions as well as the informal cultural restrictions on
information sharing").
35 See infra Part IV.
36 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
37
Id. at 351.
38 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475 (1928) (stating "[i]t is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence
of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property ... ").
39
Coincidentally, the Supreme Court would once again reintroduce the topic of
property into its Fourth Amendment analysis with United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400
(2012). However, for all intents and purposes, absent a violation of an individual's
property rights, the Katz two-pronged test remains the main way to evaluate whether
a Fourth Amendment "search" occurred. Given that most electronic surveillance
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would be forced to focus on personal privacy by asking: 1) Did a person
intend their effects to be private? (subjective question); and 2) Is society
prepared to recognize that subjective expectation of privacy as reasonable?
(objective question) 40 If both questions can be answered in the affirmative, a
constitutionally
Amendment.

recognized

"search"

occurs,

implicating

the

Fourth

These questions were much more onerous for law enforcement to answer
than whether a physical intrusion of property occurred. Consequently,
Congress passed Title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act to hedge investigative misconduct by requiring more particularized
judicial warrants to obtain electronic surveillance for law enforcement
purposes. 41 As such, these warrants were much more thorough than a regular
search warrant would require. 42 But it was not until 1967 that these higher
standards were put to another test when the Supreme Court was presented
with the question of electronic surveillance in the national security context. In

United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 43 the Court recognized that national
security cases often "reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment
values not present in cases of 'ordinary' crime. Though the investigative duty
of the Executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy
to constitutionally protected speech." 44 In balancing interests, the Court
rejected any arguments about an exception for special circumstances, 45
neither physically intrudes on property nor impairs an individual's use of such
property, electronic surveillance remains wholly within the realm of Katz.
40
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
41 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801804, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
42
SCOTT M. MATHESON, JR., PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PERILOUS TIMES 109
(2009) (citing 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2516, 2518 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007)).
43 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
44 Id. at 313.
45
Id. at 320 (providing, in relevant part, that "[t]he Government argues that the
special circumstances applicable to domestic security surveillances necessitate a
further exception to the warrant requirement. ... The circumstances described do not
justify complete exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior judicial
scrutiny. Official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or
ongoing intelligence gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally protected
privacy of speech. Security surveillances are especially sensitive because of the
103
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holding instead that "Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be
guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within
the discretion of the Executive." 46 A judicial warrant would be required to
electronically surveil domestic targets, even for national security purposes.
But the Court explicitly reserved judgement "on the scope of the
President's surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers,
within or without this country" (emphasis added). 47 The Court stressed that
the President had a duty under Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution "to
protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by
unlawful means." 4 8 This passage left open the possibility that the government
need not be constrained when surveilling foreign targets. In absence of any
direction, a number of lower courts looked to fill out the doctrine. The Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits all held that a warrant was not necessary
when surveilling foreign targets so long as the Executive branch could certify
that foreign intelligence was the object of the surveillance. 49
The Troung Dinh Hung court explained that "because of the need of the
Executive branch for flexibility, its practical experience, and its constitutional
competence, the courts should not require the Executive to secure a warrant
each time it conducts foreign intelligence surveillance." 50 But there were three
conditions: 1) "the object of the search or surveillance [had] to be a foreign
power" because in those circumstances the need for stealth and speed were so
great that the judiciary would have difficulty with the "subtle judgements

inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad and
continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the temptation to utilize such
surveillances to oversee political dissent. We recognize, as we have before, the
constitutional basis of the President's domestic security role, but we think it must be
exercised in a manner compatible with the Fourth Amendment. In this case we hold
that this requires an appropriate prior warrant procedure.").
46
Id. at 316.
47 Id. at 308.
48
Id.
49
See United States v. Troung Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Buck, 584 F2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593,
604--605 (3d Cir. 1974) (en bane); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir.
1973).
so Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 914.
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about foreign and military affairs"; 2) the primary purpose of the search had
to be to collect foreign intelligence (as opposed to prosecution), otherwise
"courts are entirely competent to make the usual probable cause
determination"; and 3) the search had to be reasonable according to the facts
and circumstances of the case.s 1
Behind this reasoning was an
acknowledgement-similar to the theoretical underpinnings of the political
question doctrines 2 -that courts are not competent to evaluate the intricacies
of Executive branch policies, and in this context, the Executive branch's needs
and methods for collecting foreign intelligence. Courts could not make a
judgement on a warrant in this context, even if Katz factors were implicated to
protect citizens' privacy interests.
The tension between trusting judges to make a warrant evaluation for
surveillance of domestic intelligence gathering (i.e., Keith), but not trusting
them in the foreign intelligence context (i.e., Troung Dinh Hung) was not lost
on the D.C. Circuit in Zweibon v. Mitchezz.s 3 One would assume that if national
security concerns are implicated in both cases, a judge would be either
competent or incompetent in both, even if citizen privacy concerns are
arguably more significant in the former than the latter.s4 The Mitchell court
posited that the explanation for the incongruity originates from an argument
that the "President's preeminent power over the conduct of foreign affairs"
under Article II, Section 2 permits surveillance without a warrant.ss But the
Id. at 915-16.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (providing, in relevant part, "Foreign
relations: There are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching
foreign relations are political questions. Not only does resolution of such issues
frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application or involve the exercise of a
discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature; but many such
questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views.").
53
516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
54 Id. at 624 (providing, in relevant part, "'Judicial competence': Although the judicial
competence factor arguably has more force when made in the foreign rather than the
domestic security context, the response of Keith to the analogous argument is
nevertheless pertinent to any claim that foreign security involves decisions and information beyond the scope of judicial expertise and experience.").
55
Id. at 615-16 (providing, in relevant part, that "[t]o be sure, the fact that the Keith
Court found the President's powers with respect to domestic affairs insufficient to
justify an exception to the warrant requirement when the domestic aspects of national
51
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court refused to hold that this power necessarily "preordain[s] the procedures
[or lack thereof] with which the President must comply in exercising that
authority." 56 The court laid out the numerous arguments against judicial
competence, 57 rejecting them all by relying on Keith for the notion that even in
the foreign intelligence context, courts so regularly deal in complex domestic
matters that such surveillance issues cannot be too complicated for judges to
comprehend. 58 "If the threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law
enforcement officers to convey its significance to a court, one may question
whether there is probable cause for surveillance." 59 The court went on to
discuss the possibility of security leaks, the nature of ongoing foreign
surveillance, the possibility of dangerous delay in following a warrant process,
and the administrative burden on the Executive branch when applying for
these warrants. 60 None of these were considered compelling. 61
This circuit split over Title III authority in the context of foreign
intelligence surveillance embodied two broad debates.
First, would
complying with Fourth Amendment requirements so substantially handicap
the Executive as to seriously infringe on the effectiveness of Article II, Section
1 and 2 powers? This debate was the objective dispute between courts in
Troung Dinh Hung and Mitchell, which disagreed over the extent to which the

warrant process would lead to leaks, delays, and administrative burdens that
would undercut the ability of the government to collect critical foreign
intelligence. 62 Second, the more subjective and theoretical issue dealt with the

security are involved, yet refused to specify what procedures would be entailed if the
national security threat had its origin with foreign powers, indicates that any difference
in result must turn on the President's peculiar powers in the field of foreign affairs.").
56 Id. at 616.
57
Id. at 641 (describing security leaks, the ongoing nature of foreign surveillance,
administrative burden, etc.)
58
Id. at 641--46.
59 Id. at 641 (citing United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297,
320 (1972)).
60
Id. at 641.
61 Id.
62 Compare Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 913 (providing that, for example, "[a]
warrant requirement would add a procedural hurdle that would reduce the flexibility
of executive foreign intelligence initiatives, in some cases delay executive response to
106

2019]

INSIDIOUS ENCROACHMENT

possibility that even if such handicapping were to occur, civil liberties should
nonetheless prevail over national security effectiveness in the foreign
intelligence context, even where an exception for special circumstances to the
Fourth Amendment might be present. This was the view that the Keith court
refused to address. These two debates remain relevant for Section 702 today.
At the time, the Supreme Court did not have to work through these
boundaries because Congress stepped to the fore. 63 A series of stunning
political developments indicated that pure deference to national security
concerns in the foreign surveillance context might be dangerous. In 1975, the
Church Committee began investigating instances where "warrantless
electronic surveillance ostensibly deployed for national security had been
seriously abused. For decades Executive agencies had been secretly
monitoring American citizens." 64

For example, President Nixon's White

House spied on political opponents as part of the Watergate Scandal and the
CIA conducted intelligence collection against domestic dissidents opposing
the Vietnam war. 65 These overt abuses were punctuated by subtler-but no
less sinister-intrusions for the sake of gathering foreign intelligence.

foreign intelligence threats, and increase the chance of leaks regarding sensitive
executive operations.") with Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 641 (finding that being "mindful of the
fact that the existence of presidential powers ... does not preclude a finding that the
legitimate exercise of those powers would in no way be frustrated by subjecting them
to prior judicial approval," and that of the factors that had been asserted -judicial
competence, leaks, intelligence gathering not implicating the Fourth Amendment,
delay that would result in substantial harm to the national security, or undue
administrative burden-none were compelling).
63
"Whether Congress has considered and authorized [an action] ... is not irrelevant
to its constitutionality. The endorsement of the Legislative Branch of government
provides some degree of comfort in the face of concerns about the reasonableness of
the government's assertions [about a program.]" ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 824
(2d Cir., 2015). This suggests that when Congress acts before the judiciary to permit an
Executive action in the national security space, the judiciary is more likely to honor it.
This is especially pertinent in the FISA context, as it is often the case that Congress
responds to negative public opinion or negative dicta with legislative changes before
judicial review.
64
MATHESON, supra note 42, at 109.
65 ELIZABETH GOITEIN & FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WHAT WENT
WRONG WITH FISA 13 (2015).
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"Between 1953 and 1973, the CIA checked more than 28 million letters (mostly
to and from the Soviet Union) against a watch list, and opened 200,000. 1166 A
program called Project Shamrock, lasting 30 years, featured the NSA acquiring
telegrams sent by American citizens-up to 150,000 messages a month. 67
These revelations precipitated the passage of FISA in 1978 as a solution to the
problem. 68
Congress seemed to reject the notion that the Executive's Article II, Section
1 and 2 authorities gave it unilateral ability to conduct foreign surveillance.
Rather, "Congress agreed that a special scheme was necessary for foreign
intelligence surveillance conducted at home, but placed strict limits on such
surveillance to ensure that it would not be used to suppress domestic dissent
or to evade the warrant requirement in ordinary cases." 69 The procedural
framework of FISA's protections are detailed below, but it cut the difference
between substantially handicapping the Executive with a full range of
procedural requirements and awarding maximal flexibility to further the IC' s
collection goals. 7° Consequently, a full criminal warrant would not be
required for foreign intelligence surveillance, but less onerous oversight
would be imposed. Under FISA, the government needs to obtain a FISC order
in an ex parte proceeding, which certifies that there is probable cause that a

66
67

Id.
Id.

See MATHESON, supra note 42, at 109 (providing, in relevant part, that "[t]he Church
Committee stressed the lack of congressional guidelines for agencies such as the NSA.
Responding to the need for a statutory framework, Congress passed the FISA in 1978
to regulate electronic surveillance of foreign intelligence information in the United
States.").
69 GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 65, at 14. The Chairman of the Church Committee
cautioned that "[i]f the government ever became a tyranny, if a dictator ever took
charge in this country, the technological capacity that the intelligence community has
given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there would be no
way to fight back because the most careful effort to combine together in resistance to
the government, no matter how privately it was done, is within the reach of the
government to know. Such is the capability of this technology." Id. (quoting
NBCUniversal Archives, The Intelligence Gathering Debate - www.NBCUniversal
Archives.com, YouTUBE (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
YAG1N4a84Dk (statement of Sen. Frank Church)).
70 See generally Part II.
68
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target of surveillance is a "foreign power" or "agent of a foreign power" and
that the specific site being electronically surveilled is equally connected to a
foreign power.71 With this nexus to foreign powers established by such an
individualized probable cause standard, the government need only
demonstrate a "significant purpose" of collecting foreign intelligence to be
awarded a surveillance order. 72 Such a test does not preclude the government
from seeking a surveillance order to also pursue criminal prosecution, but the
framework's requirement that the government demonstrate probable cause
that the target is linked to a foreign power was probable cause requirement
linked to foreign powers initially enough to permit flexible use of FISA while
preventing its abuse to easily prosecute American citizens. Yet with changes
in technology since 1978, the boundaries broke down. Scholars note that:
Although the Supreme Court in Keith attempted to distinguish
between surveillance of domestic organizations and surveillance of
foreign powers, the demarcation was never clean and has become
even more strained. Advances in technology mean that the exercise
of authorities aimed at foreigners abroad inevitably picks up swaths
of information about Americans who should enjoy constitutional
protections. But rather than develop additional safeguards for this
information, the law has developed in the opposite direction: the
government's authority to collect communications pursuant to its
foreign intelligence gathering authorities has expanded
significantly .73

Indeed, the very act of differentiating the surveillance of foreign powers
from Title III eventually exacerbated the above issue. Drawing on Troung Dinh
Hung, FISA

allowed the government to obtain surveillance orders if it
certified that the 'purpose' of surveillance was the acquisition of foreign
/1

intelligence." 74 This primary purpose test created a "strong perception within

50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(B) (2012). FISA was amended to include physical searches,
pen registers/trap and trace, and the seizure of other "tangible things" for the purpose
of foreign intelligence collection, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-29 (physical searches);§§ 184146 (pen register/trap and trace); §§ 1861 (access to business records for foreign
intelligence investigations) (2008).
72
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B).
73 GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 65, at19.
74 Id. at 23.
71
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the government that the procedures erected a 'wall' between intelligence and
law enforcement that inhibited robust cooperation." 75 Incidental intelligence
gathered through primary purpose FISA surveillance could not be shared
with law enforcement to prosecute citizens, who are guaranteed robust Fourth
Amendment protections detailed in Title III. Not only did advances in
technology mean the government was inadvertently (or intentionally)
collecting more information about Americans-information that would
otherwise be protected in a Title III search - but law enforcement could not
access information under the primary purpose test that could lead to the
prosecution of terrorists.76
In the aftermath of 9/11, many in the government viewed this wall as
unacceptable. President Bush responded by authorizing a counterterrorism
program called the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) in 2002. The New
York Times broke the story detailing how the TSP permitted the "interception
(i.e., wiretapping), without warrants, of telephone and email communications
where one party to the communication is located outside the United States"
and the NSA has a good reason to believe a connection to al-Qaeda existed. 77
To many, the program completely contravened even the minimal procedures
of FISA and arguably violated the Fourth Amendment because it scrapped the
foreign power requirement.7 8 Instead, the government began surveilling
without judicial review any U.S. person it believed was communicating with
75 Id. at 24.
See GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 65, at 24 (providing, in relevant part, "There was a
strong perception within the government that the [FISA] procedures erected a 'wall'
between intelligence and law enforcement that inhibited robust cooperation"). This
wasn't necessarily the impression of the 9/11 report, see THE NAT'L COMM'N ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 266-72 (2004). But it
was enough for the DOJ to modify its procedures to allow FISA surveillance to be
conducted under the laxer standard of "significant purpose" instead of "primary
purpose" for acquiring foreign intelligence. The rationale was that the lower standard
would allow more cooperation between law enforcement and the IC. This standard
was challenged and upheld by the FISCR. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA
Ct. Rev. 2002).
77
ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing James Risen &
Eric Lichthlau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005)).
78
See ERICLICHTBLAU, BUSH'S LAW 144, 226 (2008). See also ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency,
438 F. Supp, 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
76
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a member of al-Qaeda abroad. Understandably, people feared a return to the
pre-FISA days of government abuse; the public could not easily ascertain the
extent any unreviewed foreign intelligence was being shared with law
enforcement. And while the President reauthorized the program many times
until 2007, the administration did not disclose much of the legal and
operational components of the program -even to the PCLOB. 79 It later came
to light that the government was again relying on Article II (harkening back
to the question reserved in Keith) to argue the President had the authority to
conduct this program under the Executive's responsibility to protect the
country. 80 Even after the Bush administration assented to FISC oversight of
the TSP, public outcry over the administration's specious arguments led to
FISA Amendments precipitating Section 702. 81
The administration convinced a Democratically-controlled Congress in
2007 and 2008 to create the FAA's system of "programmatic surveillance" by
arguing that the rapidly digitalizing nature of communication required
broader authorities for electronic communication in the war on terror. 82
Section 702 was created as a result. Under its authority, "government may
conduct a program to collect any communications 'targeting' a person or
entity's communications with Americans in the United States. In other words,
the government no longer needs an individualized court order to acquire
Americans' international calls and emails, as long as the American is not the
'target' of the surveillance." 83 While programmatic limits exist, Section 702' s
is the statutory version of the TSP and a paring back from FISA' s original
procedural safeguards against government abuse by foregoing the need for
individualized orders focused on surveilling agents of foreign powers. Now,

MATHESON, supra note 42, at 111.
See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 7-10 (2006),
https://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/doj11906wp.pdf.
81 See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-usspy-on-callers-without-courts.html (describing pressure from inside and outside the
administration to curtail the program).
82 GOITEIN & p ATEL, supra note 65, at 25-26.
s3 Id.
79
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communicating with a foreigner abroad is enough to be caught up in the IC' s
foreign intelligence programs.
Consequently, the history of FISA embodies competing interests weighed
by the case law of electronic surveillance. On the one hand, harkening back to

Keith and Troung Dinh Hun, different standards may be compatible with the
Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate
need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of
our citizens." 84 But on the other hand, and in the context of uncertainty and
government abuses, "FISA was essentially enacted to create a secure
framework by which the Executive branch may conduct legitimate electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence while meeting our national commitment
to the Fourth Amendment." 85 The issue can be distilled from the original Keith
framework. There the Court believed that the Katz concerns about personal
privacy were implicated much more significantly when a domestic person was
the target of electronic surveillance compared to a foreign person. 86 As such,
Executive responsibilities to provide for the nation's safety and direct foreign
affairs were significant enough to recognize flexible oversight requirements in
the foreign intelligence context. Courts and Congress were comfortable
comporting them with the Fourth Amendment. However, when technology
advances and massive amounts of data can be collected in the process, the line
blurs to such an extent that citizen privacy concerns may be equally implicated
when foreign powers are targeted. The Keith framework begins to crumble,
but not concerns about giving the Executive flexibility to accomplish its Article
II responsibilities. This trend is embodied by the push toward the original
FISA' s restrictions designed to combat abuse (while maintain government
flexibility) and the pull from the Bush administration's TSP (that ultimately
11

United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972).
ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2006), vacated, 493
F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversed on standing grounds).
86
See United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308, 312 (1972) (holding
that while "the instant case requires no judgment on the scope of the President's
surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without
this country ... [t]here is, understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and apprehension
that this capability will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding
citizens.").
84
85
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morphed into Section 702) to require more flexibility to adequately protect
national security. This history is useful because it frames these conceptual
battles ebb and flow concerning the nature of electronic intelligence
surveillance for national security and its demands from competing interests.
Section 702' s development is therefore critical for understanding the stakes in
the constitutional battles over the program's adherence to the First
Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Separation of Powers principles. And
these stakes are increasingly higher as the nature of war and intelligence
evolves. The core question is whether Section 702's new authorities tip the
constitutional balance.

B. Authorities Under Section 702
Before addressing these new authorities, it is helpful to detail Section 702' s
original authorities to set a baseline for understanding its changes. Section 702
is programmatic, not individualized. Put differently, "the government no
longer needs an individualized court order to acquire Americans'
international calls or emails, as long as the American is not the 'target' of
surveillance." 87

Indeed, this is a major difference from typical FISA

surveillance under which the government can only surveil foreign powers or
agents of foreign powers (not just any foreigner abroad) for intelligence
information under some semblance of probable cause. 88 The statute authorizes
electronic surveillance of non-U.S. persons "reasonably believed" to be located
outside the country. 89 The Attorney General (AG) and Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) can jointly authorize such targeting for up to a year by
procuring an order from the FISC (renewal is possible). 90 If the two determine

p ATEL, supra note 65, at 26.
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a), et seq. (requiring a traditional FISA search to render some
showing of probable cause that the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign
power-including the specific facilities and/or persons to be searched. Section 702 does
away with this specificity and individualized determinations. Rather, a major
restriction is that the target of a Section 702 search has to be reasonably believed to be a
foreigner abroad.).
89 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (1978).
90 Id.
87

GOITEIN &
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exigent circumstances exist, then they can proceed without an order. 91 This
exigency is limited to those situations where "without immediate
implementation of an authorization ... intelligence important to national
security of the United States may be lost or not timely acquired ....1192 In this
case, surveillance can begin without a FISC order, but must be submitted to
the FISC within no more than seven days. 93 If it becomes known that a nonU.S. person enters the country, the government has 72 hours to continue
surveillance under a current order if discontinuing surveillance would
threaten real harm. 94 In any case, when the government applies to the FISC
for a Section 702 order, they are asking to implement a surveillance program,
which must not intentionally target any person within the U.S.; target any U.S.
person located outside the U.S.; or "acquire any communication as to which
the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition
to be located in the United States." 95 Finally, the program must comport with
the Fourth Amendment and the Constitution. 96 To ensure these limits, the
government must attest to certain targeting and minimization procedures that
will decrease the likelihood of capturing the information of U.S. persons or
those who reside in the U.S. First, the government must certify that a
11

significant purpose" of the surveillance is to capture foreign intelligence
information. 97 Second, that this intelligence is being captured with the
cooperation of electronic service providers with whom the government must
coordinate. 98 Third, "the targeting procedures must ensure that the program's
targets are indeed 'reasonably believed' to be foreigners overseas, while the
minimization procedures must be 'reasonably designed' to minimize the
collection

and

retention-and

prohibit

the

sharing-of

Americans'

Id. § 1881a( c)(2).
Id.
93 Id. § 1881a(g)(l )(B).
94 50 u.s.c. § 1805(£) (1978).
95
EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44457, SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGNERS
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES UNDER SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) 2 (2016); § 188la(b).
96 Id.§ 1881a(b)(6).
7
9 Id. § 1881a(h)(2)(A)(v).
98 Id. § 1881a(h)(2)(A)(v)(i).
91

92
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information." 99 All of this is to prevent so-called "reverse targeting" whereby
the government uses Section 702 to collect information about a foreigner
abroad, but really wishes to target a particular known person in the u.s. 100
The tools at the disposal of the government under Section 702 are both
astonishing in scale and in technological development. In 2013, a FISC report
detailed that the NSA "collected 250 million Internet communications per year
under Section 702." 101 The government can collect this information using
many methods. First, the government can tap into "upstream" facilities. 102
These facilities are the infrastructural "backbone" of the Internet and
telephone networks. 103 They include fiber cables, switches, undersea cables,
and other critical junctions. 104
As data passes through them, the NSA applies complex algorithms to
determine if they contain certain targeted information (while applying
minimization standards). 105 For example, the NSA could filter for an email
address from a foreigner abroad. It would pick up emails sent to and from
that email address (i.e., To/From Collection) and emails between non-targets
who mention the target (i.e., "About" Collection). 106 "About" Collection is
highly controversial because it can pick up the contents of U.S. person
communications that are simply about or mention a target foreigner located
abroad.
This collection method was eventually (and perhaps only
temporarily) ended by the NSA despite the government arguing for its

supra note 65, at 26; §§ 1881a(d)(l)(A), 1881a(e)(l ), 1801(h)(l ).
p ATEL, supra note 65, at 26.
101 Lru, supra note 95, at 1.
102 See Memorandum Opinion, No. [REDACTED], slip op. at 22-23 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3,
2011 ), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0716/0ctober-2011-Bates-Opinion-ando/o
200rder-20140716.pdf.
103 See Kris, supra note 18, at 9 (discussing " ... the international switches or other
backbone facilities ... " through which communications transit).
104 See Kris, supra note 18, at 9-10, 24-45 (discussing the network of cables that makes
up the backbone of telecommunications networks).
105 See Kris, supra note 18, at 9-10 (discussing how the NSA finds targeted information
during "upstream" collection and applies minimization standards.)
106 Kris, supra note 18, at 9.
99

GOITEIN & PATEL,
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permissibility under the Constitution. 107 Controversy also exists as to whether
the government can store and later search unminimized data (i.e., before the
approved search algorithms are applied). This storage could allow the
government to search incidental data for related (or unrelated) law
enforcement purposes-all without adequate Fourth Amendment
procedures. This technique is colloquially known as "backdoor searching." 108
It is possible to conduct backdoor searches with U.S. persons data obtained

using about" collection. 109
The government can also use Section 702 for downstream" collection,
/1

/1

colloquially known as PRISM collection. 110 Here the government works with
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), like Google, to retrieve data that likely
contains foreign intelligence information. ISPs will either send this data along
on their own fruition or respond periodically based on search algorithms the
government gives them which are pre-approved by the FISC.

This is

especially helpful for data that passes through upstream facilities encrypted

107 The NSA stopped "about" collection "to resolve problems it was having
complying with special rules imposed by the [FISC] in 2011 to protect Americans'
privacy . . . . The problem stemmed from certain bundled messages that internet
companies sometimes packaged together and transmitted as a unit. If even one of them
had a foreign target's email address somewhere in it, all were sucked in .... The NSA
was having technical difficulties figuring out a way to deal with bundled packages"
and so stopped collection to comply with the goals set out by the FISC with regard to
the bundles. See Quinta Jurecic, NSA Stops "About" Collection, Lawfare (Apr. 28, 2017,
2:14 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/nsa-stops-about-collection.
108 Kris, supra note 18, at 12-13.
109 See Neema Singh Guliani, Congress Just Passed a Terrible Surveillance Law. Now
What? ACLU (Jan. 18 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-andsurveillance/congress-just-passed-terrible-surveillance-law-now (suggesting that "the
NSA conducts over 30,000 of these "backdoor" searches a year and, while the FBI
refuses to report their number, we know they perform these searches routinely when
investigating a crime, assessing whether they should open an investigation, or even
just hunting for information about foreign affairs.").
110 Lru, supra note 95, at 1. PRISM was the program revealed by Edward Snowden's
disclosures, see supra note 107.
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but becomes unencrypted upon reaching an ISP. 111

Most Section 702

intelligence comes from this type of collection method. 112

C. Separating Theory from Practice
On the surface, the authority under Section 702 is designed to capture Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) 113 communications from foreigners abroad. It echoes the
original differentiation focus in Keith: by only concentrating on foreigners
abroad, American constitutional privacy concerns are not heavily implicated,
and the government is afforded maximum flexibility. As such, the
government does not need an individualized court order every time it chooses
to surveil a foreigner abroad, even if such surveillance incidentally picks up
on a U.S. person's communications. Rather, the FISC need only approve of
the programmatic design of a SIGINT program -it does not need to know who

See Siobhan Gorman & Jennifer Valentino, New Details Show Broader NSA
Surveillance Reach, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new111

details-show-broader-nsa-surveillance-reach-1377044261 (describing the process of
NSA downstream collection and queries involved); see also Barton Gellman & Ashkan
Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers Worldwide, Snowden
Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centersworldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/l 0/30 I e5 l d661 e-4166-11e3-8b74d89d714ca4dd_story .html ?u tm_term=. 9dcb79c831 da (describing what the Snowden
leaks revealed about NSA surveillance programs).
112 LIU, supra note 95, at 1 ("The NSA collected 250 million Internet communications
per year under 702. Of these communications, 91 % were acquired 'directly from
Internet Service Providers,' using a mechanism referred to as PRISM collection. The
other 9% were acquired through what the NSA calls "upstream collection," meaning
acquisition while Internet traffic is in transit from one unspecified location to
another."). Note how staggering this number is-if only 1% of the 250 million included
communications with Americans, that would be 2.5 million Americans indirectly
surveilled.
113 LIU, supra note 95, at 2 ("Acquisitions under Section 702 are also geared towards
electronic communications or electronically stored information. This is because the
certification supporting acquisition ... requires the AG and DNI to attest that, among
other things, the acquisition involves obtaining information from or with the assistance
of an electronic communication service provider.").
117
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or what specifically the government plans to surveil. 114 At its framing, this
design was viewed as sufficient to prevent the government from abusing its
foreign surveillance authorities to spy on Americans as they did in the preFISA era. Theoretically, the balancing seems correct. There should be a lot of
flexibility for a type of surveillance that does not per se pose much harm to
American privacy interests.
In practice, collection of electronic communications to or from Americans
is increasingly beyond incidental. 115 Section 702 represents such a stark
change from original FISA authority because it eliminates [an individualized]
/1

court

order

requirement

for

the

domestic

capture

of

foreigners'

communications with Americans."
So long as the surveillance has a
significant purpose (how big is "significant"?), of acquiring foreign
116

intelligence from a foreigner abroad, it would seem that any communications
to or from a U.S. person is fair game to be collected without an individualized
warrant typical of the Title III process. For any particular SIGINT program,
the government might have another "significant purpose" of prosecuting
terrorists. Under this framework, the warrantless intelligence collected under
Section 702 could theoretically be used to prosecute an American whose
communications were "incidentally" collected. Indeed, some argue that "the
legislative history makes clear that facilitating the capture of communications
to, from, or about U.S. persons was a primary purpose, if not the primary
purpose of the FAA." 117 The potential for these end-runs around the Fourth
Amendment are only exacerbated by the fact that unlike previous iterations of

GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 65, at 27 ("Under Section 702 ... the court has no role
in approving individual instructions at all.").
115 Id. at 26 ("The existence of targeting and minimization requirements, as well as a
reverse targeting prohibition, has enabled the government to portray Section 702 as a
program designed to capture the communications of non-U.S. persons abroad .... With
the exception of e-mails stored in the United States, [Section 702] had no impact on the
government's ability to collect the communications of foreigners with other foreigners.
The sea change that the statute brought about was the elimination of the court order
requirement for the domestic capture of foreigners' communications with
Americans.").
116 Id.
117 Id.
114
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FISA, the government can surveil any non-U.S. person overseas, not just those
reasonably believed to be an agent of a foreign power. 118
With the sheer amount information collectable under the program, the
efficacy of 702 was certainly on the mind of Congress as Section 702 was set to
expire in 2017 without reauthorization.

II.

REAUTHORIZATION
DEBATES

The debates to reauthorize and amend Section 702 embodied a fundamental
question. Representative Barbara Lee (D-CA) framed it by quoting Alexander
de Tocqueville, saying "the reason democracies invariably prevail in military
conflict is because democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and
encourages those traits that are indispensable to success:
initiative,
innovation, courage, and love of justice." 119 The extent that Section 702 could
be improved to forward these ends was the conceptual dispute at the heart of
the reauthorization debates. Indeed, the opportunity for disagreement on this
front was varied-at least four different bills and various individual
amendments were proposed. 120 All sought to provide its own theory. Is a
more flexible, extensive Section 702 the answer to promoting the innovation
and initiative of the IC to keep our country safe? Or should the country have
the courage and love of justice to handicap the useful tools of foreign
surveillance to ensure our liberties were preserved? How would Congress
strike a balance "between our cherished liberties and smart security?" 121 The
Id. at 27 (["The court's] substantive role is limited to determining whether generic
sets of targeting and minimizations procedures comply with the statute ... and with
the Fourth Amendment. The Court is not even informed of the specific targets of
surveillance or the facilities to be surveilled, let alone asked to approve them. And the
court may not review the substance of the government's certifications, including its
certification of a significant foreign intelligence purpose, even for 'clear error."'). This
review should be compared with the more robust Title III and regular FISA authorities.
119 164 CONG. REC. H146 (daily ed. Jan. 11. 2018) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee).
120 See USA Liberty Act of 2017, HR. 3989, 115th Cong. (2017); FISA Amendments
Reauthorization Act of 2017, S. 2010, 115th Cong. (2017); FISA Amendments
Reauthorization Act of 2017, H.R 4478, l 15th Cong. (2017); USA Rights Act, S. 1997, l 15th
Cong. (2017); USA Rights Act, H.R. 4124, 115th Cong. (2017).
121 164 CONG. REC. H146--47 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 2018) (statement of Rep. Lee).
118
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answers were far from clear. The reauthorization debates were so pivotal
because it was not evident that Section 702 would be reauthorized - let alone
expanded-given the above privacy concerns. A focus on the legislative
history illuminates the critical considerations at play.
Debates over reauthorizing Section 702 began to foment with the 2017
nomination of then-Congressman Mike Pompeo (R-KS) to be the CIA Director.
Congress was already acutely aware that the 2012 reauthorization for Section
702 was set to sunset at the end of the year. Additionally, Section 702 had been
"the focus of ceaseless criticism from a politically diverse group of opponents
who insist[ed] that it transcends constitutional bounds and represents the
harbinger of an Orwellian surveillance state: charges that reached a crescendo
in the aftermath of the disclosures by Edward Snowden in 2013." 122 With this
context in mind, Congress took the nomination as an opportunity to have an
/1

open discussion about the future of the CIA," which included the IC' s
intelligence collection capabilities, even though Section 702 has much more to
do with the NSA's collection methods than the CIA. 123 In a long speech,
Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), who would later introduce The USA Rights Act,
criticized the Pompeo nomination -detailing his support for wide ranging
metadata and "about" collection programs. 124 Troubled by Representative
Pompeo' s belief in a "broader and more flexible [standard of surveillance]
than the standard that currently applies to Section 702," Senator Wyden keyed
up his issue with Section 702 as one concerned with the primary purpose
standard and backdoor searches. 125
Other senators who opposed
Representative Pompeo did so on similar grounds. Senators Tom Udall (DNM), Jon Tester (D-MT), and Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) all spoke out, using
the nomination debates as a proxy to voice their concern about backdoor
searches and how "the Constitution limits how much intelligence agencies

George W. Croner, Terrorists, America is Still Listening: Section 702 is Alive and Well,
FOREIGN PoL'Y RESEARCH INST. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/0l/
terrorists-america-still-listening-section-702-alive-well/ #_ftn8.
123 163 CONG. REC. 5367-84 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2017).
124
Id at 5373-76 (statement of Sen. Wyden).
12s Id.
122
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and the government can intrude into the lives of Americans." 126 Senator
Bernie Sanders (D-VT) even described Section 702 as a tool for "Big Brother"
to abuse, and called for amending the program to keep its effectiveness, but
"without invading the privacy rights of the American people." 127 Those who
supported Representative Pompeo did so on typical grounds-citing his
background and accomplishments. 128 Others chose to engage with their
colleagues' concerns. Notably, Senator James Lankford (R-OK) reminded his
colleagues that the "CIA has strict prohibitions from gathering data on U.S.
persons" -implying that the issue lies with the information sharing of
warrantless intelligence between the IC and law enforcement, not on the scope
by which the IC can collect intelligence. 129 Narrowing the issue on backdoor
searches seemed pervasive across the aisle.
Although Representative Pompeo was confirmed relatively easily, 130 the
surveillance issues through which many opposed his nomination were just
beginning to brew. By March 1, 2017 the full Judiciary Committee was hearing
testimony on Section 702 from various IC agencies. 131 Again, Senator Wyden
led the floor discussion, this time highlighting concerns about "targeting
mistakes," "about" collection, and the implications of upstream/downstream
collection-namely "you don't even have to be communicating with one of
the government's targets to be swept up ... law abiding Americans who have
done absolutely nothing wrong, both overseas and in the United States can
have their communications collected." 132 Ultimately, Senator Wyden called
for more information to assess the privacy impact of Section 702 and whether
"liberty and security are not mutually exclusive" :133
Should there be safeguards against reverse targeting? Should
Congress legislate on "upstream" collection and collection of

126

Id. at S379-81.
Id. at S382-83 (statement of Sen. Sanders).
128 Id. at S385 (statement of Sen. Wyden).
129 Id. at S383 (statement of Sen. Lankford).
130 164 CONG. REC. S385 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2017) (passed 66 to 32 with bipartisan
support).
131 163 CONG. REC. D212 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2017).
132 163 CONG. REC. S1814-17 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2017) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
133 Id. at S1817.
127
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communications about targets which raises unique concerns about
the collection of the communications of law-abiding Americans? Are
the rules related to dissemination, use, and retention of these
communications adequate? Should there be limits on the use of these
communications by the FBI for non-intelligence purposes? 134

With the debate keyed up along these lines, Congress began to
experiment. In the House, Representative Tulsi Gabbard (D-HI) introduced
legislation to amend FISA to "codify the prohibition on the acquisition of
'about' communications under Section 702." 135 Her bill, H.R. 2588, never
made it out of committee. 136 Conversely, Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR)-long a
supporter of PISA-introduced a bill "that would reauthorize Section 702
permanently, as it is, with no changes." 137 In his view, concerns about Section
702 were exaggerated: "we can't tie the hands of our national security officials
at the precise moment that our enemies are taking the gloves off," suggesting
that "if you are concerned about protecting Americans' privacy rights, then
you should support extending 702 [given its host] of privacy protections." 138
His bill, S. 1297, also never made it out of committee. 139 Clearly, neither a
band-aid fix nor the status quo would do, even though AG Jeff Sessions and
DNI Daniel Coats requested reauthorization "without amendment beyond
removing the sunset provision." 140 In the months preceding reauthorization,
a flurry of proposals flooded Congress.
The USA Liberty Act (H.R. 3989) was first introduced by the House
Judiciary Committee. The bill "proposed a new framework of protections and
transparency requirements to ensure that the government's use of Section 702

Id.
164 CONG. REC. H4423 (daily ed. May 22, 2017).
136 Summary: HR. 2588 - 115th Congress (2017-2018), https://www.congress.gov/
bill/l 15th-congress/house-bill/2588.
137 163 CONG. REC. S3296 (daily ed. Jun. 6, 2017) (statement of Sen. Cotton).
13s Id.
134
135

139

Summary: S. 1297 - 115th Congress (2017-2018), https://www.congress.gov/
bill/115 th-congress/ senate-bill/1297.
140 Letter from Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III and Director of National
Intelligence Daniel R. Coats to Congressional Leadership (Sep. 7, 2017),
https ://www.justice.govI opa/press-release/file/995661/download.
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accords with principles of privacy and due process." 141 Among many reforms,
the bill would require: a national security purpose to query data collected;
law enforcement to receive individualized court orders based on probable
cause to view the content of communications collected on a Section 702
program (excluding metadata), logging queries, and strengthening oversight.
The bill would also ban "about" collection programs, improve the PCLOB and
whistleblowing protections, and encourage the IC to share information among
themselves and foreign allies. 142
The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 (S. 2010) was
introduced in the Senate within weeks of the USA Liberty Act. It took the
opposite approach to scaling back Section 702. It would give permission to
the IC to conduct "about" collection, pending a review of a formal DNI report
and FISC certification for any resumed programs. 143 Nevertheless, the bill
would prohibit the use of Section 702 intelligence for law enforcement
purposes, except for certain serious enumerated offenses, mainly related to
terrorism. 144

Perhaps most importantly, it would extend the ability to

temporarily surveil U.S. citizens abroad without a FISC order in emergency
situations if there was related exigency to surveil a connected non-U.S.
person. 145
The USA Rights Act (S. 1997) was Senator Wyden's proposed solution (a
companion legislation was introduced in the House by Representative Zoe
Lofgren (D-CA)) and featured perhaps the most radical paring back of Section
702. The bill would end backdoor searches by requiring a warrant for law
enforcement to search for Section 702 intelligence. 146 Moreover, it would ban
141
The USA Liberty Act of 2017, HR. 3989, 115th Cong. (2017),
https ://judiciary.house .gov/wp-content/u ploads/2017/10 /100517 -USA-Liberty-Act. pdf.
142 Id.

S. 2010, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017).
Id. § 5.
14s Id. § 6.
146
The USA Rights Act One Pager, https://www.wyden.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/102017%20USA%20RIGHTS%20Act%20one-pager. pdf;
see
also
Lawrence Husick, The USA Rights Act: What's in There? FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH
INSTITUTE (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.fpri.org/2017/11/usa-right-act-what-in-there/
("The bill reforms the present law by losing the "back door searches" loophole by
prohibiting the government from searching through communications collected under
143

144
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"about" collections in non-terrorism investigations and clarify that "reverse
targeting" is prohibited (i.e., using Section 702 to target a foreigner, but really
with the intention to access communications with a U.S. person). 147 The bill
sought to "place stronger statutory limits on the use of unlawfully collected
information" and require the FISC to have an appointed Constitutional
Advocate to argue against the government. 148
The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 (H.R. 4478)
tracked closely with Senate version of the same name. In addition, it would
require annual approval of querying procedures, publication of minimization
procedures,

"new procedures for unmasking Americans'

names in

intelligence reports," additional reporting requirements to Congress, and the
temporary suspension of "about" collection pending Congressional review. 149
But it differed in its approach to querying procedures. Whereas the Senate bill
would require the FBI to inform the FISC of any query hitting on U.S. persons
as a way to guarantee consistency with the Fourth Amendment, the House bill
would not require such an individualized approval but would provide the FBI
with the opportunity to receive a FISC order based on standard probable
cause. 150 Despite these differences, commentators were surprised that the bill
also mirrored The USA Liberty Act in its minimization declassification

702 to deliberately conduct warrantless searches for the communications of specific
Americans.").
147 Id.
14s Id.
Loren Blinde, House Intel Committee Introduces Section 702 Reauthorization Bill,
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY NEWS (Dec. 1, 2017),
http://intelligencecommunitynews.com/house-intel-committee-introduces-section702-reau thorization-bill/.
150 See George W. Croner, The Gun Lap: FISA Renewal in the Homestretch FOREIGN POLICY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE (Dec. 6, 2017) , https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/12/gun-lap-fisarenewal-homestretch/ ("The SSCI bill, for example, includes a provision requiring that
the FBI inform the FISC (within one business day) of any query that "returns
information that concerns a known United States person .... The HPSCI bill takes a
somewhat different route. There is no requirement that any form of individual query
be cleared by the FISC; however, in those instances where a query of the Section 702
database is not designed to extract foreign intelligence information (i.e., is undertaken
for law enforcement inquiries), the HPSCI bill furnishes the FBI with the option of
applying for an order from the FISC ....").
149
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procedures and mandating "specific procedures regulating the 'unmasking'
of U.S. person identities [caught up in Section 702 surveillance] as part of a
broadening of existing statutory minimization requirements." 151
Between these four proposals, Congress had plenty of options for
reforming Section 702 before its expiration date.
Many other floor
152
amendments were proposed, but conceptually the USA Liberty and the USA
Rights Act stood for a paring back of Section 702 authority whereas the dually
named FISA Reauthorization Act bills arguably stood for the opposite. 153
Ultimately, the bill that became law was the product of reconciliation of the
two FISA Reauthorization Act bills by the House and Senate Judiciary and
Intelligence Committees. But given the Congresspersons' concerns about
Fourth Amendment violations from about," backdoor, and reverse targeting
/1

collection, what accounts for the ratcheting up of Section 702?
The legislative history suggests a complex story and hardly a partisan
one. 154 The possibility for reform was most possible in the House where 58
Republicans and 125 Democrats voted for the USA Rights Act, whereas 65
Democrats joined 178 Republicans to vote for the bill (S. 139) that would
become law. 155 Republicans who supported S. 139 believed that the USA
Rights Act "would begin resurrecting the information-sharing walls between
national security and law enforcement that the 9/11 Commission identified as
a major factor in the failure to identify and thwart the 9/11 plot." 156 They
believed S. 139 was "drafted in the spirit of the USA Liberty Act" and,

151

Id.

See Sarah Tate Chambers et. al., FISA Section 702 Reauthorization Resource Page,
LAWFARE (Jan. 9, 2018), https://lawfareblog.com/fisa-section-702-reauthorizationresource-page.
153 For a good comparison of the four bills, see George Croner, The FISA Section 702
Saga: With Section 702 Expired, Where Do Things Go From Here?' FOREIGN PoL'Y RESEARCH
INST. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/0l/Croner-FISABills-Table-2017-18.pdf.
154 Indeed, the bill that became law, S. 139, began as the Rapid DNA Act-" a bill to
expand the use of DNA in law enforcement." See GovTrack Summary of S. 139 (Jan. 14,
2018), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/l 15/sl39/summary (supporting that
legislation evolves in complex ways).
155 Croner, supra note 122.
156 164 CONG. REC. H143 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 2018) (statement of Rep. Stewart).
152
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consequently, was a bipartisan solution that allayed privacy concerns. 157 For
example, one Congressman thought the bill struck the right balance - rather
than ending 'abouts' [sic] collection ... if NSA wants to reestablish 'abouts
/1

[sic] communication' collection, [the] NSA would first need to go back to
court, [and] convince the judge that it has satisfied the court's concern." 158
Most Democrats did not agree. They argued that:
S. 139 fails to address the core concerns of Members of Congress and
the American public-the government's use of Section 702
information against United States citizens investigations that have
nothing to do with national security. The warrant "requirement"
contained in the bill is riddled with loopholes and applies only to
fully predicated, official FBI investigations, not to the hundreds of
thousands searches the FBI runs every day to run down a lead or
check out a tip. S. 139 exacerbates existing problems with Section 702
by codifying so-called "about collection," a type of surveillance that
was shut down after it twice failed to meet Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. S. 139 is universally opposed by technology companies,
privacy, and civil liberties groups across the political spectrum from
the ACLU to FreedomWorks. 159

A significant number of Republicans were apt to agree. Libertarian
conservatives, some part of the House Freedom Caucus, were equally
concerned about backdoor searches and

/1

about" collections, urging their

colleagues to force the government "to get a warrant [and] stay out of the
house of communications." 160 Nevertheless, some Democrats believed "[they
had] to come down in favor of honoring our Constitution and our civil
liberties, but [could not] do that completely at the expense [of national
security]. 161 "They believed the USA Rights act "would disable 702." 162
Despite a last minute effort by Representatives Justin Amash (R-MI) and Zoe

157

Id.
Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
158
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at H143 (statement of Rep. Conaway).
at H146 (statement of Rep. Lee).
at H145 (statement of Rep. Poe).
at H148 (statement of Rep. Pelosi).
at Hl54 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
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Lofgren (D-CA) to save the USA Rights Act, S. 139 prevailed to preserve most
of the status quo and reject the best chance of Section 702 reform. 163
Proceedings in the Senate followed in a similar fashion despite initial
uncertainty resulting from a tweet by President Trump as to whether he
supported S. 139.164 Overall, the failure of major reform efforts is likely the
result of a few trends. First, leadership in both the House and Senate opposed
FISA reform. Notably, House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI) and Minority Leader
Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) opposed the USA Rights Act, which likely helped whip
up support for S. 139. 165 Second, of the 28 freshman Republicans elected to the
House in the 2016 Trump wave, 24 voted for S. 139 in line with the White
House's direction, which now seemed to give credence to the belief that the
current Executive branch embraced Section 702 as a critical tool rather than

Id. at H160 (recording failure to pass the Amash-Lofgren amendment).
Martin Matishak, Trump Undercuts White House Stance Hours before Critical
Surveillance Vote, POLITICO (Jan. 11, 2018, 9:21 AM EST; updated Jan. 11, 2018, 1:43 PM
EST), https ://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/l l/trump-surveillance-fisa-vote-279321
(detailing how Trump made two contradictory tweets before the reauthorization vote,
one indicating his desire for reforms to Section 702 and the other indicating he would
like to proceed with the status quo. The confusions almost completely derailed the
reauthorization vote.). In the Senate, 43 Republicans and 23 Democrats voted for S.
139. Despite discussion of potential filibuster, the Senate vote was far less contentious,
see Ashley Killough & Ted Barrett, After Unexpected Scare, Senate Overcomes Filibuster
and Advances FISA Extension Bill, CNN (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.mn.com/
2018/01/16/politics/senate-fisa-bill/index.html.
165 Gopal Ratnam, With House Passage of FISA Measure, Action Moves to Senate,
ROLLCALL (Jan. 11, 2018, 3:11 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/housepassage-fisa-measure-action-moves-senate ("In an unusual alignment, House Speaker
Paul D. Ryan and Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi opposed the Amash-Lofgren
amendment, saying that it would weaken intelligence agencies' ability to stop terror
plots in a timely fashion.").
163

164
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something to be feared. 166 Of the 27 freshman Democrats, 14 voted for S. 139. 167
Clearly, the 2016 elections ushered in new Congresspersons across the aisle
who were sympathetic to a robust Section 702. Whereas the old guard,
particularly Tea Party Republicans, were more sympathetic to the USA Rights
Act. These new views might not have been dispositive to the result, but they
certainly made the margin greater, perhaps to an extent that mounting a
realistic reform effort was out of the question. Third, and relatedly, there is
reason to believe that the last-minute vote on the USA Rights Act was
engineered by Speaker Ryan as part of a compromise with more conservative
Republicans.

By allowing "one amendment with the changes the bill's

opponents wanted to get a vote," but knowing full well the vote would fail,
Speaker Ryan likely converted some Congresspersons on the fence to approve
S. 139 "by at least giv[ing] these members the chance to say they got
something," (i.e., floor time to speak their grievances to constituents and
bemoan the failure of their preferred reform plan, while still letting them
support national security with an affirmative vote on S. 139). 168 It does seem
that members were flipped in this way when the roll-call votes for the USA
Rights Act and S. 139 are compared. 169 At least in the Senate, members

166 See White House Statement of Administration Policy - House Amendment to S.
139 (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/ll/
saps139hr_20180109.pdf (stating that "[i]f the House Amendment to S. 139 were
presented to the President in its current form, his advisors would recommend that he
sign the bill into law."). Compare Newly elected members to the 1151h Congress, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Newly_elected_members_to_the_l 151h_Congress with S. 139
Roll Call Vote (Jan. 11, 2018), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2018/roll016.xml (showing the
number of new members of Congress and comparing that to the roll call for votes on S.
139).
167 S. 139 Roll Call Vote (Jan. 11, 2018), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2018/roll016.xml.
168 Deirdre Walsh & Ashley Killough, House Passes FISA Reauthorization Despite Trump
Tweet Criticizing the Program, CNN (Jan. 11, 2018, 1:53 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2018/01/11/poli tics/fisa-house-vote-congress/index.html.
169 Fifty-eight Republicans voted for the USA Rights Act when it was introduced.
Only 45 voted against S. 139. This reduction suggests that 13 members both voted for
The USA Rights Act and then voted for S. 139 after the USA Rights Act failed, or at
least abstained in the S. 139 vote. Compare S. 139 Roll Call Vote, http://clerk.house.gov/
evs/2018/roll016.xml, with The USA Rights Act Roll Call Vote, http://clerk.house.gov/
evs/2018/rollOl 4.xml.
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switched positions on Section 702 easily, with Senator Feinstein being a
notable example.170
Politics certainly matters. And the political currents of the 2016 election
undoubtedly shaped Section 702's ultimate fate. But conceptually, the failure
of major reform efforts can be placed into the historical push and pull of
electronic surveillance described above. Not unlike the rhetoric deployed at
the time the TSP was instituted, Congress was thinking about reforming
Section 702 at a specific moment when terroristic threats seemed to be
evolving. Frequently, Congresspersons reminded the public that the bombing
"attacks like that in London are the new normal, [and] we have to be proactive
... one way to be proactive and keep our country safe is to reauthorize section
702." 171 Indeed, the democracy destroying purpose of ISIS featured
prominently in the legislative debates-the example of Hajii Iman and Shawn
Parsons's threat to civilian lives were highly relevant cases studies featuring
the efficacy of robust Section 702. 172 And against a threat which seeks to
eliminate the very existence of democracy, not the typical foreign state actor,
the reauthorization debates implicitly place a robust foreign surveillance tool
like Section 702 as necessary, a priori, to ensuring a state even exists to create
forum for civil liberties. 173 But this view is one that is historically influenced.

170 Evan Halper, After Calling for Surveillance Reform, Democrats Help Kill It, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 17, 2018, 11:40 AM PST), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-fisademocrats-20180117-story.html ("Feinstein broke with privacy advocates from the
right and left to cast a crucial vote in favor of leaving the program largely unchanged
for the next six years. Feinstein' s retreat back to a hawkish posture on Section 702 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) gave supporters of the status quo the
vote they needed to quell a growing movement in the Senate for more privacy
protections.").
171 163 CONG. REC. S5826 (daily ed. Sep. 19, 2017) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
172 164 CONG. REC. S227 (daily ed. Jan. 17, 2018) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
173 Indeed, this was a consideration of the Keith court when contemplating the efficacy
of warrantless surveillance for domestic national security purposes: "Unless the
Government safeguards its own capacity to function and preserve the security of its
people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties might be
endangered." Keith, 407 U.S. at 312; see also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574
(1941) ("Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an
organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost
in the excesses of unrestrained abuses."). Nevertheless, the "recognition of these
129
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When government abuses national security tools to make that forum
impossible, a posteriori, the focus of the debate shifts to ask what principles the
nation is actually protecting. To put it differently-and to paraphrase
Benjamin Franklin-if we sacrifice liberty for national security, do we get
neither? Or, if we sacrifice national security for liberty, do we also get neither?
These questions are essentially the same but framed differently. And yet in
different historical moments, the question is often asked in one way or
another. This framing matters because it tilts the balance toward that which
is being potentially sacrificed. The threat of ISIS, global terrorism, and the
success of Section 702 placed civil liberty advocacy in the tough position of
having to address the second framing: is national security worth sacrificing
given these clear threats? But if these tools get abused, these advocates will
benefit from being able to reframe the question and better reform Section 702
authorities. In the face of its enormous potential and success as a surveillance
tool, 2017 was a difficult historical moment to push for major reform, even
with credible concerns about abuse. 174 The fluidity of this historical framing is
a constant feature of electronic surveillance debates. But regardless of this
changing context, whether the reformed Section 702 complies with the
Constitution will remain a standard question.

elementary truths does not make the employment of by the Government of electronic
surveillance a welcome development" disregarding completely the Bill of Rights.
Keith, 407 U.S. at 313.
174 Although, "in the post-Snowden revelations era [there is an] absence of credible
allegations of political or venal use of 702 authorities. In essence, the public evidence
confirms that the problems that used to bedevil secret electronic surveillance through
the Hoover/Nixon era-namely, senior political figures deploying intelligence agencies
and tools for inappropriate, abusive political purposes - have been resolved by a
robust legal regime of oversight and reporting." Jack Goldsmith & Susan Hennessey,
The Merits of Supporting 702 Reauthorization (Despite Worries About Trump and the Rule of
Law), LAWFARE (Jan. 18, 2018, 9:20 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/meritssupporting-702-reauthorization-despite-worries-about-trump-and-rule-law. In other
words, absence of credible abuse may have helped kill the major reform efforts more
than anything else-the historic moment did not compare to the abuse of electronic
surveillance in the 20th Century. See id.
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THE REAUTHORIZATION
ACT'S REFORM TO
SECTION

702

Section 702 has withstood frequent constitutional challenge.

Whether it

continues to succeed as a constitutionally viable law will depend on its recent
changes. When President Trump signed S. 139 into law, Section 702 changed
in the following ways:
•

Querying Procedures: The AG and DNI must now adopt certain
procedures that will regulate how intelligence analysts search
databases of raw Section 702 intelligence. These querying procedures
are subject to FISC review for compliance with the Fourth
Amendment.175 Additionally, procedures must be adopted which
keep "record of each 'United States person query term' used." 176 The
FBI must get a court order on grounds of probable cause to access
Section 702 intelligence communications "responsive to U.S. person
search terms where the query 'was not designed to find and extract
foreign intelligence information' and instead is performed 'in
connection with a predicated criminal investigation' unrelated to
national security." 177 Here, predicated criminal investigation likely
means one that is beyond its initial stage, but already has some
semblance of probable cause of illegality. 178 But an order may not be
required if there is a reasonable threat of serious harm or death. 179

•

Criminal Proceedings. The reforms go on to detail the circumstances
where a U.S. person's data collected by a Section 702 surveillance can

175 Emma Kohse, Summary: The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, LAWFARE
(Jan. 18, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/summary-fisa-amendmentsreauthorization-act-2017.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See Croner, supra note 122 ("It would have been helpful to have defined "predicated
criminal investigation," but the statute is silent, so one is left to assume that it is an
investigation that has moved beyond a preliminary assessment of suspected criminal
activity that is unrelated in any way to national security; i.e., your garden variety
criminal investigation conducted through the FBI's criminal investigative division.").
179 See Kohse, supra note 173.
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be used in a criminal investigation. The FBI must otherwise get a court
order described above or the criminal proceeding must "involve one
of an enumerated list of conduct, including death, kidnapping, serious
bodily injury, crimes against minors, incapacitation of critical
infrastructure, cybersecurity, and transnational crime." 180 Regardless,
reporting requirements to Congress now exist to mandate disclosure
of the use of Section 702 intelligence for law enforcement
investigations against U.S. persons. 181
/1
•

About" Collection. The new reforms do not ban about" collection
/1

but allow the IC to resume such collection if it so chooses (i.e., should
the NSA so choose since voluntarily ceasing such activities in 2017
amidst compliance concerns). 182 However, the DNI and AG must
inform Congress prior to restarting the program and provide a FISC
/1

opinion approving any specific program and a summary of the
protections in place to detect any material breach." 183 The IC can begin
about" collection after the period of Congressional notice if any
11

exigency exists. Anytime a material breach occurs in the program's
protections, Congress must now be notified. 184 Finally, because
restarting about collection on approval of the FISC will likely "present
a novel or significant interpretation of the law," amid briefs will be
considered as to this question. 185
Overall, there were many more reforms made to Section 702, especially
for transparency, including: publication of minimization procedures after
declassification, increased whistleblower protections, review of applicable
classification systems, strengthening of the PCLOB, increased capacity in civil
liberties offices across the FBI and NSA, and clarification of the Section 705
emergency provision. 186 However, the reforms to querying procedures and

180
181
182

Id.
Id.

See Jurecic, supra note 107 (explaining why the NSA stopped" about" collections).

Id.
184 Id.
lSs Id.
186 Id.
183
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about" collection are most relevant to a re-evaluation of the Section 702' s

constitutional compliance. The querying reforms might help assuage concerns
about backdoor searches, but Gregory Croner has noticed that the FBI still has
significant leeway. He points out that the querying reforms are merely a:
Political gesture offered to appease critics rather than seriously
constrict access to the Section 702 database for foreign intelligence
purposes. For example, after creating this new 'querying' limitation
in purely criminal cases, the FISA Reauthorization Act hastens to
point out that the FBI is relieved of any obligation to seek a FISC
order: (1) where the FBI is conducting lawful queries of the Section
702 database (i.e., queries directed to producing foreign intelligence
information); or (2) where the results of an FBI query are "reasonably
designed to find and extract foreign intelligence information,
regardless of whether such foreign intelligence information would
also be considered evidence of a crime;" or (3) where the FBI query is
initiated to evaluate "whether to open an assessment or predicated
investigation relating to the national security of the United States;" or
(4) where the query is initiated upon reasonable belief that the content
of Section 702 communications "could assist in mitigating or
eliminating a threat to life or serious bodily harm." 187
Consequently, the strength of Section 702' s fundamental authorities,
/1

pending about" collection re-evaluation, has been left intact notwithstanding
the transparency reforms enacted.

IV.

REEVALUATING POINTS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTENTION

There are open questions in the aftermath of Section 702' s reauthorization not least of which is whether Congress was even aware of the full-extent of
Section 702's use to make an informed decision. 188 Regardless, the program's

Croner, supra note 122.
Some commentators argue that "we don't know how the government is using
Section 702 data, but we do know that it is singling out communities for increased
scrutiny based on country of origin, faith, and race. The administration has deemed
illegal immigration as a leading national security threat, and President Trump has even
said that legal immigration poses a national security threat." Robyn Greene, Americans
Wanted More Privacy Protections. Congress Gave Them Fewer, SLATE (Jan. 26, 2018;
187
188
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expansion reopens the viability of constitutional challenge in areas where
litigation has previously failed. Namely, the program's changes to querying
procedures and the possibility of restarting about" collection are arguable
/1

violations of the Fourth Amendment. While the course of true law pertaining
/1

to the [Fourth Amendment] ... has not ... run smooth[ly]" 189 because it suffers
from "both the virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity," 190 a few basic
requirements are clear. First, only government surveillance that meets the
Jones-Katz requirements 191 will count as a "search" implicating the Fourth
Amendment. Second, any such searches must be "reasonable." And third, a
warrant must be obtained to carry out these searches, unless an exception
applies. Querying and about" collection arguably violates each of these three
requirements.
First, given the amount of incidental information that can be
acquired in Section 702 surveillance (particularly
about"
surveillance), it is no longer plausible under the Katz factors to claim
the program does not amount to a Fourth Amendment search because
it only targets foreigners abroad. Nevertheless, this question has not
been directly addressed by the Supreme Court, and its resolution
might greatly narrow the government's ability to carry out the
program.
Second, assuming Section 702 does involve Fourth Amendment searches,
there is a strong argument that such searches are unreasonable. Trends in case
law involving government searches using technology imply an uneasiness
with technology that can acquire large amounts of information on a person.
With increased collection ability, courts are becoming concerned that the
government can acquire a mosaic of information that penetrates the most
private aspects of a person's life. 192 As Section 702 collects more incidental
/1

/1

7 :45 AM),
https ://slate. com/technology/2018/01/ congress-reauthorization-of-section702-of-the-fisa-is-an-expansion-not-a-reform.html.
189 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
190 JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 42 (1966).
191 See supra PART II.A. for a discussion of Katz and Jones.
192 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, (2018) (citing United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416-420 (2012) and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
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information on U.S. persons, it surely triggers the same concerns that courts
are increasingly striking down as unreasonable Fourth Amendment searches.
Third, even if Section 702 searches are considered reasonable, it is not clear
that current Section 702 FISC orders can be considered warrants as
contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. If they are not, then the government
can only conduct such searches if an exception to the warrant requirement
applies.

Here, the special needs exception and the incidental overhear

exception (the -often-cited exceptions justifying warrantless FISA searches) do
not easily apply for Section 702' s new querying procedures and for about"
/1

collection.
In sum, the new querying procedures and about" collection
authorizations are susceptible to constitutional challenge on just about every
/1

front of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The following discussion lays out
the applicable doctrine for each of the three Fourth Amendment requirements
and previews the legal analysis that might soon be presented to courts
reviewing the Reauthorization Act.

A. Querying and "About" Collection are Fourth Amendment
Searches
As mentioned above, the foreign intelligence surveillance doctrine established
in Keith lays the foundation for FISA surveillance under a theory that
surveillance targeting foreigners implicates less privacy concerns than
domestic surveillance. As such, this surveillance does not amount to a Fourth
Amendment search. But as commentators note, by passing Section 702
Congress

"specifically

authorized

programmatic

warrantless

foreign

intelligence surveillance in a manner almost guaranteed to sweep up a
substantial volume of communications involving U.S. persons." 193 And so the
debate between courts like Troung Dinh Hung and Zweibon v. Mitchell remains
a continuous issue: is it really the case today that foreign intelligence
surveillance targeting foreigners abroad does not implicate privacy concerns
of U.S. persons caught up in the surveillance?

And would requiring

Steve Vladeck, More on Clapper and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Exception,
(May 23, 2012, 3:32 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-clapper-andforeign-intelligence-surveillance-exception.
193

LAWFARE
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compliance with the Fourth Amendment frustrate the Executive's Article II
power?
As to the first, it seems hard to believe that individuals do not have a
recognizable expectation of privacy over the content of their communications
that are increasingly swept up, and subject to review, by Section 702:
[T]he collection of foreign intelligence surveillance today involves
Americans' communications at a volume and sensitivity level
Congress never imagined when it enacted FISA. If the government
wished to acquire the communications of a non-citizen overseas in
1978, any collection of exchanges involving Americans could
plausibly be described as "incidental." Today, with international
communication being a daily fact of life for large numbers of
Americans, the collection of their calls and e-mails in vast numbers is
an inevitable consequence of surveillance directed at a non-citizen
overseas. The volume of information collected on U.S. persons makes
it difficult to characterize existing foreign intelligence programs as
focused solely on foreigners and thus exempt from ordinary Fourth
Amendment constraints. 194

As to whether complying with the Fourth Amendment will frustrate the
Executive, that does not seem to be the case with the current operation of the
FISC. While the FISC rarely rejects FISA or Section 702 applications, 195 the
process of approving such generalized requests has hardly reduced the
amount of people the government has surveilled under these programs. 196 The
Supreme Court has explicitly rejected arguments that lack of resources or

GOITEIN & PATEL, supra, note 65, at 21.
"From 1996 to 2013, less than 0.032 percent of applications were denied, even
though requests grew by more than 200 percent." Id. at 37 (citing ADMIN. OFF. OF THE
U.S. CTS., WIRETAP REP. tbl. 7 (2013); ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., WIRETAP REP. tbl. 7
(2002)).
196 See generally Statistical Transparency Report Regarding the Use of National
Security Authorities-Calendar Year 2017, Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/icotr/2018-ASTR-CY2017 -FINAL-for-Release5 .4.18. pdf (while exact numbers may be hard to specify with certainty, the ODNI lays
out a steady increase in the estimated targets of Section 702 orders, increasing from
roughly 89,000 in 2013 to about 129,000 in 2017. These numbers likely to do not account
for the number of individuals incidentally caught up in the surveillance.).
194
195
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strain on the Executive automatically obviates the warrant requirement.1 97
Thus, as a matter of operation, FISA surveillance does constitute "searches"
under the Fourth Amendment-particularly because the government has
done just fine complying with procedural restrictions enacted by Congress.
Even if such searches focus on metadata or individual information not subject
to privacy protections, courts are "tak[ing] a more holistic and less formalistic
view of the government's actions and examin[ing] what the government is
really learning about us when it collects and processes massive amounts of
data." 198 Enough "non-searches" can amount to a constitutionally recognized
search when a government program is viewed holistically. 199
As discussed above, the Supreme Court never had to explicitly address
the Katz framework left open by Keith in the foreign intelligence space because
Congress essentially assumed foreign surveillance did constitute a Fourth
Amendment search by creating FISA procedures which mimic Title III
warrant processes. 200 Nevertheless, if the Supreme Court were to wholly
review Section 702, it might be compelled to once and for all declare such
foreign surveillance as Fourth Amendment searches when U.S. persons are
involved.
Such a finding would hardly be surprising given FISA's
development. But how the Supreme Court-or even lower courts-opine on
the scope of these searches, and its interaction with Article II powers, will have
ramifications on how "reasonable" they are when conducted by increasingly

See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984) (rejecting the Government's
argument that an obligation to obtain warrants for monitoring beepers withdrawn
from public view would lead to the Government obtaining warrants in a large number
of cases as unpersuasive); see also Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 636-37 (recognizing the U.S.
Supreme Court's warning that arguments regarding the foreign intelligence warrant
exception cannot be based on the length of time needed to obtain the warrant or the
potential amount of warrants necessary to comply).
198 JOSHUA DRESSLER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
VOL. I:
INVESTIGATION 104 (7th ed., 2017).
199 Indeed, this is the general theory of the mosaic theory: government acquisition of
seemingly inconsequential personal information can, when added together, amount to
such an intrusive holistic picture into an individual's life that it can implicate the Fourth
Amendment. For a full explanation, including criticism, see generally Orin Kerr, The
Mosaic Theory and the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012).
200
See supra Part II.A.
197
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intrusive and advanced surveillance methods. Here is where future litigants
have room to argue, particularly for about" searches. Not only do these
collection methods count as Fourth Amendment searches, but they are so
/1

broad that no argument can make them reasonable, even when interacting
with the Executive's Article II powers related to foreign affairs and national
security. The scope of these Article II powers in this space will undoubtedly
influence the means by the government can continue to adapt its surveillance
methods under Section 702. Indeed, courts seem to care about the mode by
which the government intrudes as part of the search analysis. 201
Consequently, litigation against Section 702 might proceed by challenging
specific types of surveillance (e.g., upstream) as not only searches, but
unreasonable per se by nature of its technology alone.

B. Newly Authorized Section 702 Searches are Unreasonable
Litigants need not focus too much on the scope of whether a search occurred
because current case law suggests courts are increasingly amendable to
finding overbroad technological collection as unreasonable, even in the
metadata space.

/1

A search is not beyond Fourth Amendment scrutiny; for it

must be reasonable in its scope and manner of execution." 202 Scholars have
pointed to the D.C. District Court in Klayman v. Obama as portending a shift
among courts to reign in the definition of reasonableness in the intelligence
collection context, particularly with new trends in the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. 203 Klayman was a successful challenge to the FISA
Section 215 metadata program on unreasonableness grounds, but its

See, e.g., State v. Bonnell, 856 P.2d 1265, 1276-77 (Haw. 1993) (finding that the mode
of government intrusion matters as to whether government surveillance counts as a
Fourth Amendment search).
202 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013).
203 See Patrick Walsh, Stepping on (or over) the Constitution's Line: Evaluating FISA
Section 702 in a World of Changing Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, 18 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. PoL'Y 741, 783 (2015) (discussing the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of a reasonable expectation of privacy in Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013)).
201
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implications are far reaching. 204 "The Klayman court emphasized that one of
the driving purposes behind the Fourth Amendment is to prevent the
government from acquiring a significant amount of private information
without a judicial determination of probable cause." This concern is equally
implicated with Section 702, particularly regarding incidental about"
collection. Instructive too is how the FISCR treated the predecessor to Section
/1

702 in In re Directives. 205 The court determined that the special needs exception
to warrant requirement applies "when surveillance is conducted to obtain
foreign intelligence for national security purposes and is directed against
foreign powers or agents of foreign powers reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States." 206 Again, scholars note that "a strict reading of the
In re Directives foreign intelligence exception would result in a determination
that Section 702 does not qualify for this exception to the warrant
requirement." 207 The court in In re Directives upheld the Section 702
predecessor on reasonableness grounds but based on protections that were not
replicated when Section 702 was updated in 2008 and in subsequent years. 208
These cases demonstrate a willingness for FISA courts and district courts
to strike down provisions of statues similar to Section 702 on Fourth
Amendment reasonableness grounds and a narrower conception of the special

See generally Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 41 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that the phone
record metadata collection constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment and that
Klayman was likely to succeed in demonstrating that the government's searches were
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
205
See In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1016 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (reviewing the identical
predecessor to Section 702 under the 2007 short-lived Protect America Act and holding
that directives issued to the petitioning service provider under the Protect America Act
satisfied the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement).
206
Id. at 1012 (emphasis added).
207 Walsh, supra note 200, at 786.
208
See id. at 787 ("Unlike the PAA, section 702 does not require a determination that
"probable cause existed to believe that the targeted person is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power." This negatively affects both sides of the balancing test as
applied to section 702. Without a connection to a foreign power, the government
interest in national security is reduced .... " (quoting In re Directives Pursuant to
Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551F.3d1004, 1014 (FISA Ct.
Rev. 2008)).
204
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needs exception described below. They also portend precedent that does not
quite match with the increasingly expansive Section 702. The FISC court will
have to squarely face this issue if the government decides to reactivate about"
/1

collection programs as part of the recent reauthorization. Whether about"
/1

collection passes reasonableness muster might very well hinge on the
changing privacy implications at the core of the third-party doctrine. In United

States v. Jones, the concurring opinions contemplate the fact that "it may be that
[long-term surveillance] through electronic means, without an accompanying
trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy." 209
Indeed, the
surveillance data collected via the third-party doctrine is so much more
intrusive in the information era than the phone records which spawned the
creation of the doctrine in Smith v. Maryland. 210 A mosaic of data points can
pierce one's private life in intricate detail, even when incidentally collected. 211
The reasonableness prong of the Fourth Amendment turns on a balancing test
between privacy interests and security interests that has frequently favored an
expansive interpretation of Section 702. But if the Court amends the reach of
the third-party doctrine based on "technological advances that have made
possible non-trespassory surveillance techniques" courts may very well lean
on cases like Klayman and In re Directives to preserve "the evolution of societal
privacy expectations." 212
Future cases might address the so-called
equilibrium-adjustment theory whereby the Court does and should update
Fourth Amendment rules to maintain the balance of government power as
technology changes. The idea that is that some technological shifts so
transform the level of government investigative power (whether expanding it

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012).
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979) (holding that a pen register
does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because individuals do not
have a subjective or societal reasonable expectation of privacy in regard to their phone
numbers).
211
See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213-14 (2018) (citing United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405-06 (2012) and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34
(2001)).
212 Jones, 565 U.S. at 414-15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
209
210

140

2019]

INSIDIOUS ENCROACHMENT

or restricting it) that they justify new rules to restore the prior level of
government power. 213
The outcome of Carpenter v. United States, which evaluated the bulk
collection of cell-site data, seems to confirm this theory by recognizing that
"seismic shifts in digital technology" which produce "deeply revealing"
amounts of information can constitute a search, regardless of the third-party
doctrine. 214 In other words, people have a cognizable privacy interest in the
information they give to third parties, particularly when this information
reveals more as its collected and evaluated in bulk. Each individual data point
may not violate any privacy interests. But when technology permits the
government to put together a complex mosaic made of these individual points,
the resulting picture can implicate Fourth Amendment protections. While the
Court clarified that its holding does not consider other collection techniques
/1

involving foreign affairs or national security," Carpenter will provide
ammunition for those who will argue that bulk collection programs constitute
protected searches. These arguments might restrict the government's ability
to search unminimized data or the breadth of about" collection.
/1

C. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement Do Not Apply
Even assuming Section 702's newest authorities are considered reasonable
searches, they still need go through a warrant process to comply with the
Fourth Amendment. Whether or not current Section 702 FISC orders are
considered permissible warrants is still an open question. In the regular FISA
context-where the FISC approves individualized orders to surveil agents of
foreign powers-the answer is clearer. In re Sealed Case held that the pre-2008
FISA "did not itself violate the Fourth Amendment, at least largely because
FISA warrants were probably still effectively 'warrants' within the meaning of

213 Orin Kerr, Four Thoughts on the Briefing in Carpenter v. United States, LAWFARE (Nov.
17, 2017, 3:06 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/four-thoughts-briefing-carpenter-vunited-states.
214 See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (holding that the Government usually
must obtain a search warrant in order to request cell location information from a
wireless carrier).
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the Warrant Clause." 215 The alternative argument was that the Keith and

Troung Dinh Hung line of cases creates a foreign intelligence surveillance
exception to the warrant requirement because of the strain such a warrant
would place of the Executive's Article II responsibilities and due to the
minimal privacy implications. 216 But as discussed above, both of these
arguments seem operationally unpersuasive, and In re Sealed Case refused to
"endorse a categorical foreign intelligence surveillance exception" to warrant
requirement by effectively holding traditional FISA warrants as in compliance
with the Fourth Amendment.217
But with Section 702, FISA warrants are no longer necessary for
surveilling foreigners abroad, just programmatic FISC orders. If In re Sealed
Case did not opine on pre-Section 702 compliance with the foreign intelligence
exception, then whether Section 702 complies with the exception is an open
question. This question is especially important considering that the exception
is based on the Keith rationale that foreign surveillance does not require a
warrant because privacy interests are not as implicated compared to domestic
surveillance. Given Section 702's expansion, that is an assumption worth
reevaluating, particularly as it relates to the reasonableness of searches. This
question was one the plaintiffs sought to address in Clapper v. Amnesty
International. 218 As that case was dismissed on standing grounds, the issue
remains a live question that could upend Section 702 in favor of the
government. 219

Steve Vladeck, More on Clapper and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Exception,
(May 23, 2012, 3:32 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-clapper-andforeign-intelligence-surveillance-exception.
216
See id. (discussing the origins of the foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement).
217 Id.
215

LAWFARE

See generally Clapper v. Amnesty International, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013)
(determining that plaintiffs failed to illustrate that FISA surveillance against them
would impose an impending, future injury).
219
Id. at 402 (holding that "respondents cannot manufacture standing by choosing to
make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.
We therefore hold that respondents lack Article III standing."); id. at 422 (preserving
the core of the merits by noting that "any dissatisfaction that respondents may have
about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's rulings -or the congressional
218
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Nevertheless, many commentators proceed on the assumption that
notwithstanding the uncertainty about the foreign intelligence exception, the
special needs and incidental overhear exceptions are more than enough to
permit warrantless Section 702 searches. 220 But in this space, litigants have the
strongest arguments to challenge the new provisions of Section 702 because
neither of the exceptions seem to permit querying of incidentally collected
data or about" collection.
/1

Griffen v. Wisconsin made clear that "when special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause
requirement impracticable," court-issued warrants are unnecessary. 221
Promoting public safety is often considered one such exigency and the FISCR
has permitted FISA under these grounds, remarking that such foreign
intelligence surveillance "goes well beyond any garden-variety law
enforcement objective," even with the incidental collection of a U.S. person's
data. 222 Although the Supreme Court has never directly endorsed foreign
surveillance under the special needs analysis, it would likely accept the FISC' s
rationale that there is a "high probability that requiring a warrant" could harm
"vital national security interests" that depend on the time sensitive
information Section 702 is able to acquire. 223 This view seems especially likely
given the holding of City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, where the Court recognized
stopping a terrorist attack as justification for a suspiciousness search. 224 But
the new Section 702 authorities might go beyond this broad exception. Under

delineation of that court's role-is irrelevant to our standing analysis" and therefore
remains a live question.).
220
See Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing Before the H.
Judiciary Comm., 115th Cong. 2 (2017) (statement of Jeff Kosseff).
221 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (citing: New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).
222 In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, 551 F.3d at 1011 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); [Redacted Case Name], 68-69 (FISA Ct. 2011)
(Bates, J., mem.).
223 Id. at 69.
224 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) ("The Fourth Amendment
would permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent
terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a
particular route." (citing Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 662-63 (7th Cir. 1999)).
143
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the reauthorized Section 702, backdoor searches of incidentally collected data
on U.S. persons seem permissible when the investigations are related to
foreign intelligence, national security, or imminent threat of injury. 225
Moreover, it seems like law enforcement can search this data at any point, for
any purpose, before a fully "predicated" investigation-i.e., before they
suspect a particular U.S. person has committed a crime in question, they can
query Section 702 databases looking for any connections on which to establish
probable cause. 226 The ability for law enforcement to undertake these
warrantless fishing expeditions arguably stretches beyond the special needs
exception.
In City of Los Angeles v. Patel, the Court clarified the special needs
exception as applying in situations where there is a special need and "where
the primary purpose of the searches is distinguishable from the general
interest in crime control." 227 Consider too some crucial points in Edmond. The
Court cited Delaware v. Prouse for the proposition that discretionary
roadblocks set for public safety were unconstitutional extensions of the special
needs exception primarily because discretionary, suspicionless stop[ s]"
constituted an "exercise of standardless and unconstrained discretion" /1

discretion which could be abused. 228 If warrantless roadblock searches could
be permitted under the special needs exception, they would have to apply to
all cars or be randomized to prevent abuse of discretion. Additionally, "the
Court must consider the nature of the interests threatened and their
connection to the particular law enforcement practices at issue." 229 In Edmond,
roadblocks designed to stop cars for drug searches were impermissible
225 See Croner, supra note 149 (explaining how a reading of the statute arguable
permits backdoor searches where the FBI query is initiated to evaluate "whether to
open an assessment or predicated investigation relating to the national security of the
United States;" or where the query is initiated upon reasonable belief that the content
of Section 702 communications "could assist in mitigating or eliminating a threat to life
or serious bodily harm.").
226 Id.

See City of Los Angeles, Calif. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015); see also Ferguson
v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81-86 (2001).
228 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 39 (2000) (citing Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648,661 (1979)).
229 Id. at 33.
227
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because searching for drugs is not a law enforcement practice connected to the
public safety interest in promoting safe driving (whereas, stopping cars to
prevent DUis is much more clearly connected to promoting safe driving). 230
Applying these principles, the Reauthorization Act's backdoor provisions
seem dubious. In the first instance, the significant purpose standard for FISA
searches permitted by In Re Sealed Case231 seems to conflict with the Patel
court's clarification that the special needs exception must have a primary
purpose distinct from law enforcement. In Re Sealed Case upheld the
congressional decision under Fourth Amendment grounds to require only a
"significant purpose" of collecting foreign intelligence to receive a FISC
surveillance order. 232 Unlike the previous standard, law enforcement could
also be a significant purpose so long as collecting foreign intelligence
remained significant. It is important to notice the incongruity between the
more permissive significant purpose test to begin foreign surveillance and
what is permitted under the special needs exception for warrantless searches
of U.S. persons in the public safety context. When incidental data on U.S.
persons is collected under the significant purpose collection, there might be a
problem in later using this information under the more restrictive primary
purpose Patel standard. For example, if foreign intelligence is collected with
the main aim of prosecuting a foreign terrorist-but nevertheless meets the
threshold for a significant foreign intelligence aim-there is an issue if
incidental information is picked up. Suppose a potential U.S. person is caught
up in this surveillance as a co-conspirator. Because the initial aim of the
surveillance had a significant purpose of prosecuting a foreign terrorist, the
primary purpose of later using incidental information to prosecute a U.S. co-

Whereas, stopping cars to prevent DUI's is much more clearly connected to
promoting safe driving. Id. at 43 ("Nor can the narcotics-interdiction purpose of the
checkpoints be rationalized in terms of a highway safety concern similar to that present
in Sitz ... only with respect to a smaller class of offenses, however, is society confronted
with the type of immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb that the sobriety
checkpoint in Sitz was designed to eliminate.").
231
310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) ("The FISA as amended is constitutional because
the surveillances it authorizes are reasonable [under the significant purpose test].").
232 Id.
230
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conspirator is indistinguishable from the crime control purpose in Patel if the
special needs requirement underpins Section 702. Without a separate
warrant/probable cause determination, the very act of conducting a query
triggers Fourth Amendment concerns. To conduct a warrantless special needs
search, the primary purpose must be distinguishable from crime control. In
many cases this requirement is impossible to meet because the data is collected
ex ante via a FISC order which applies a standard that allows law enforcement

purposes to be a substantial reason to implement foreign intelligence
surveillance.
Much of the complexity arises from the meaning (or lack thereof) of the
"significant purpose" test required for the collection of foreign intelligence.
Nevertheless, as the wall between foreign intelligence and law enforcement
continues to weaken, an argument can be made that backdoor searches-or
even Section 702 surveillance generally-stretches the limit of the special
needs exception. This is not the case because the national security interests
implicated are not special needs within the doctrine-promoting national
security squarely falls under the purview of public safety recognized as the
classic exigency within the doctrine. It stretches the limit because the use of
the information collected is increasingly tied up in the crime control which the
special needs analysis excludes from its purview under Patel.
More clearly problematic is the ability for law enforcement to query
Section 702 databases before a predicated investigation. To the extent that law
enforcement queries data in an unrandomized or exclusive fashion, it would
seem no different than the contexts held unconstitutional in Prouse or Edmond.
It might just be data in this situation, but the same abuse of discretion and

privacy concerns are still relevant. The implication in Prouse was that if
officers had full discretion to make any suspicionless stop grounded in public
safety reasons, they could use this authority to search people based on race,
gender, or any immutable characteristics.
Likewise, in Edmond, the
implication was that impermissible profiling could also be deployed in the
drug stop situation. Whether someone is carrying drugs is much less obvious
compared to drunkenness. Officers might rely on stereotyping or animus in
subjecting individuals to an invasion of privacy to conduct searches. These
concerns are present with the pre-predicated backdoor searches: unless the
146
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querying is conducted in the same randomized or all-encompassing way,
nothing stops law enforcement from abusing its discretion in similar ways.
There are undoubtedly some caveats to these cases. For one, it can be
argued that querying can be conducted in a randomized way. Plus, when law
enforcement seeks to prosecute under terrorism statutes, there might be
enough of a connection to the special need of national security to pass muster
under Prouse/Edmond.

Not to mention the Patel case was decided in the

administrative search context (i.e., ordinance compliance), so it is not
completely clear its clarification of the special needs analysis maps onto the
foreign intelligence surveillance context. 233 Additionally, some courts have
held that "subsequent querying of a Section 702 collection, even if U.S. person
identifiers are used, is not a separate search" which does not make Section
/1

702 surveillance unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 234 But many
courts have found in other contexts that "subsequent querying of the
information after acquisition is a search requiring a warrant." 235 Thus, it is an
open question whether Section 702 querying by law enforcement is a separate
search from that of the initial intelligence collection. If so, Fourth Amendment
concerns are heavily implicated. Regardless, the Reauthorization Act extends
Section 702 authority far enough to at least allow reasonable grounds for
litigation in this area. And the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v.
/1

Jones and Riley v. California show that at least some Justices recognize the
heightened potential for governmental overreach in an age when digital
records are kept on nearly every aspect of our lives ... now more than ever,
because of their heightened vulnerability to government abuse in the
Information Age." 236 Indeed, some suggest that technological advancement
See, e.g., MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 263-64 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that
lower courts have endorsed the applicability of the special needs doctrine, at least in the
national security context).
234 United States v. Mohamud, 2014 WL 2866749, at *26 (D. Or. Jun. 24, 2014), aff'd, 843
F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 2016).
235
Id. at *24 (citing United States v. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885, 910-13 (9th Cir. 2013)
(computer search)); United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 720-21 (9th Cir. 2009)
(searching a backpack after accessing a hotel room); United States v. Mulder, 808 F.2d
1346, 1348 (9th Cir. 1987) (laboratory testing of pills).
236 Maximilian Sladek de la Cal, City of Los Angeles v. Patel: The Fourth Amendment's
Special Needs in the Information Age, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1137, 1137 (2016).
233
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can actually help reduce the use of the special needs exception-with one
suggestion calling on courts to "use statistical forecasting to measure whether
continued surveillance is necessary to address the special needs of law
enforcement." 237
As to the potential application of the so-called "incidental overhear"
exception, similar doctrinal concerns are implicated. Before reauthorization,
three district courts-United States v. Mohamud, United States v. Muhtorov, and
United States v. Hasbajrami- heard cases challenging Section 702, all of which

upheld the program citing the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant
requirement and its reasonableness after a balancing of interests. 238 But these
cases failed to appreciate the incidental overhear arguments that defendants
were making about incidental collection under Section 702. The incidental
overhear doctrine was established in the Title III context where defendants
/1

argued that their own communications were acquired unlawfully because
they were not identified by name in [search] orders." 239 Essentially, law
enforcement placed a wiretap on a suspect that incidentally caught
incriminating evidence on bystanders, who were never targeted in the initial
warrant. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that it was not unlawful to
introduce this incidentally overheard evidence so long as the warrant in
dispute was sufficiently particularized: "identify[ing] the phone line to be
tapped and the conversations to be acquired, and the government followed
rigorous 'minimization' procedures to avoid the collection of 'innocent
conversation."' 240 In many ways, FISA' s own procedural requirements map
onto these same restrictions. But if the courts conceive of these protections as
Justin W. Whitney, FISA's Future: An Analysis of Electronic Surveillance in Light of
the Special Needs Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WASHBURN L. J. 127, 129 (2007).
238 See generally United States v. Mohamud, 2014 WL2866749, (D. Or. Jun. 24, 2014);
237

United States v. Muhtorov, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1240 (D. Colo. 2015); United States v.
Hasbajrami, 2016 WL 1029500 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016).
239 Elizabeth Goitein, Another Bite out of Katz: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance and the
Incidental Overhear Doctrine, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 115 (2018) (citing United States v.
Donovan 429 U.S. 413, 416-20 (1977) (examining the doctrine in the context of an FBI
wiretap under Title III and United States v. Khan, 415 U.S. 143, 144-47 (1974)
(addressing the doctrine in the context of a Dept. of Justice application under Title III
related to an illegal gambling investigation)).
240
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something more-as creating an exception to the warrant requirement for
incidentally collected communications-then Section 702 seems further
insulated from constitutional challenge.
Indeed, this jump is what the Mohamud, Muhtorov, and Hasbajrami courts
have assumed by including incidental U.S. person data within the foreign
intelligence exception. 241 Yet they are two different issues. It is one thing to
say Section 702 surveillance is permitted without a warrant due to the Keith
foreign intelligence exception. Yet is quite another to say incidental data are
swallowed by this exception because the Supreme Court has permitted such
an overlap in the criminal investigation context. Elizabeth Goeitein frames the
issue accordingly:
If Americans have a reasonable expectation of

privacy in their
communications with foreigners overseas, then the 'incidental
overhear' cases would justify dispensing with a warrant only if
they established an exception to the warrant requirement. This
follows from the basic rule ... that warrantless searches and
seizures are per se unreasonable unless an established exception
applies. 242

Yet courts have made a flawed assumption.

It may be that "when

surveillance is lawful in the first place ... the incidental interception of nontargeted U.S. persons' communications with the targeted persons is also
lawful."' 243 But this does not mean that subsequent querying of the incidental
communications does not require a warrant. In Goeitein's words: the cases
establishing the incidental overhear doctrine did not "hold or suggest that no
warrant was necessary to collect the defendants' conversations, as long as
there was a warrant for the person with whom the defendants were

See generally United States v. Hasbajrami, 2016 WL 1029500 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016)
(rejecting motion to suppress evidence collected under FISA §702 and rejecting the
assertion that incidental collection triggers the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Muhtorov, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1240 (D. Colo. 2015); United
States v. Mohamud, 2014 WL2866749 (D. Or. Jun. 24, 2014) (rejecting a motion for
dismissal and reversal of a conviction and suppression of evidence predicated on an
argument that the introduction of §702 evidence had violated a notice requirement).
242 Goitein, supra 236, at 120.
243 United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 440-41 (9th Cir. 2016).
241
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communicating." 244 To the contrary, the warrants questioned in these cases
had been broad to anticipate the capture of incidental incriminating
information because the warrant had detailed the phone line and
conversations it sought to pick up. 245 Moreover, exceptions to the warrant
requirement are "jealously and carefully drawn" to an extent that it is hard to
imagine the Supreme Court has created an incidental overhear exception
without expressly saying so. 246 Additionally, with Section 702's increased
collection and querying authorities, it is hard to argue that the Title III
incidental overhear doctrine is as easily applicable in the FISA context- where
incidental collection is magnified tenfold. If anything, the incidental overhear
doctrine stands for the proposition that a "small number of innocent
conversations" [picked up] does not invalidate a warrant. This is a far cry
from

holding that the

government can warrantlessly

acquire the

communications of anyone in contact with a lawfully surveilled target." 247
And yet this is the position held by many district courts as well as the FISC for
FISA applications. Consequently, the point of contention is that incidentally
collected information on U.S. persons may not invalidate the foreign
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement (if it is recognized), but that
does not mean such incidental information can be searched by the government
in any meaningful way without judicial review. Such an argument could
challenge the FBI' s new ability to search incidentally collected Section 702 data
to fish for information to establish probable cause.
All this analysis highlights a shaky foundation for Fourth Amendment
authority to query incidental data collected about U.S. persons under the
Reauthorization Act. The government's reliance on the special needs
exception and the incidental overhear doctrine are open to substantial
challenge given Section 702' s expansion.

And the reasonableness of the

searches conducted -particularly regarding "about" collection -exist in an

244
24s

Goitein, supra note 236, at 122.
Id.

See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 416-20 (1977); United States v. Kahn,
415 U.S. 143, 144--47 (1974).
247 Goitein, supra note 236, at 123.
246
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era where courts are increasingly finding ways to rollback principles like the
third-party doctrine to protect privacy interests in an intrusive digital age.
In short, these areas of constitutional contention are a few among many
open issues that have been made viable by the expansion of Section 702.
Notwithstanding narrow cases challenging the vagueness of statutory phrases
in the Reauthorization Act (e.g., what does "predicated" mean?), these
contention points are places where courts are most likely to restrain Section
702- something Congress could not manage to do. It is unlikely any court

will find the program completely unconstitutional, but it will not be surprising
if certain querying procedures or "about" collection (which now likely just

require a "reference" to the target) are restricted given trends in the precedent
discussed above. 248 Nevertheless, Clapper v. Amnesty International serves as
warning that justiciability will be a difficult issue to surmount because it is
often difficult for plaintiffs subject to surveillance to prove injury in fact
caused by a specific Section 702 search. In the future, the best chance for
justiciable challenges may come from the ISPs who cooperate with the
government and are increasingly required to provide more and more technical
assistance to carry out downstream surveillance imposed by the NSA.

V.

CONCLUSION

It is easy to find many missed opportunities for reform with the

Reauthorization of Section 702. The concerns of privacy advocates were not
meaningfully addressed, including clarification on unmasking. Some of the
more complicated issues that will face FISA in the next decade were seemingly
unanticipated. For example, the role of international data sharing, whether
service providers will be compelled to provide increasingly complicated
technical assistance to de-encrypt Section 702 data, and the growing ability to
exploit smart technology connected the Internet for surveillance purposes. 249

248 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2018) (defining "[t]he term "abouts communication"
means a communication that contains a reference to, but is not to or from, a target of
an acquisition authorized under subsection.").
249 Examples of smart technology connected to the internet, commonly known as the
internet of things, include doors, appliances, and cars.
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These are all open issues that Section 702 is unprepared to explicitly address. 250
Nevertheless, ideas abound for reforming FISA and Section 702. Some
propose an "inextricably intertwined test" to replace the significant purpose
test such that FISA material would be admitted in court only if it is intertwined
with national security related crimes. 251 The idea would prevent the use of
incidental FISA data on U.S. person's to be used in prosecutions for ordinary
crime.

Others push for procedural protections, such as "expand[ed]

opportunities for appellate review of FISC and FISCR cases." 252 Additionally,
"increased public reporting, mandatory disclosure of FISC opinions, and more
adversarial briefing at the FISC" have frequently been proposed. 253 Relatedly,
/1

many propose that querying procedures should provide for some
independent periodic auditing of the queries and the recorded justifications
for them" to ensure maximum accountability and to provide litigants with a
record to challenge searches. 254
There is no shortage of ideas for improving FISA and Section 702. But
there is often a shortage of political capital which is almost always contingent
on the historical moment in which changes to FISA are considered. Broadly
speaking, the history of electronic surveillance is one of ebb and flow.
Evolving threats to national security demand evolving tools for staying ahead
of those threats. But the government's long history and record of abusing
these tools often causes a cyclical curtailing of those instruments. Depending
on the moment, the issue of balancing liberty and safety gets framed in the
alternative ways discussed above.
The least nuanced - but perhaps truest-explanation for Section 702' s
expansion in 2018 is that the question was framed as liberty reducing security
rather than the alternative. In this narrative-with the threat of ISIS and a

See Kris, supra note 18, at 13-27
Wesley S. McCann, Addressing the Balance: Restructuring CIPA and FISA to Meet the
Needs of Justice and the Criminal Justice System, 80 ALB. L. REV. 1131, 1166 (2016).
252 Id. at 1171.
253 Id. at 1166.
254 See generally Elizabeth Goitein and Robert Litt, A Way Forward on Section 702 Queries,
LAWFARE (Feb. 20, 2018, 12:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/way-forward-section702-queries.
250
251
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program that has not yet compared to the government abuses of surveillance
emblematic of the mid-20th century-Congress was not willing to cripple the
crown jewel of the IC. But because history tells us that it is certainly possible
Congress does not know the full extent of Section 702 or has been confused
about the extent of its success, courts must remain vigilant. The power of
Section 702 belongs to the flexibility at which it can be used. Congress has
likely relinquished its power to amend the program until it again faces
renewal six years from now. But the courts have several avenues to hear
constitutional litigation against the program. Perhaps the greatest obstacles
are justiciability doctrines like standing, which prevent cases from easily being
brought before Article III courts. Nevertheless, one hopes that as the
government continues to expand its electronic surveillance programs, the
probability of a case and controversy increases so courts can adequately weigh
in. And lest courts give a blank check to the government, we can expect that
the judicial drama surrounding the heightened strength of Section 702 is far
from over.
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